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In 2009, to attack the financial and political support structure of the growing insurgency 
in Afghanistan, the FBI created the Major Crimes Task Force-Afghanistan (MCTF-A). 
However, within approximately two years, the FBI had withdrawn its personnel from the 
task force, and the MCTF-A’s efforts to counter corruption within the highest levels of 
the Karzai government were at the center of a highly public diplomatic row that changed 
the strategic direction of U.S. national security objectives for Afghanistan and the region. 
Was the outcome predictable and can lessons be captured by examining the FBI’s 
experience with the MCTF-A, and should the FBI ever consider attempting to build 
capacity in post-conflict or developing nations? 
The FBI is now being asked by U.S. government partners to build similar rule of 
law (ROL) capacity-building programs around Africa and the Middle East. Through the 
MCTF-A case study, a set of cultural, legal and political criteria was developed for 
evaluating potential capacity-building partners and programs. 
This thesis proposes a repeatable and structured process to help the FBI evaluate 
potential capacity-building partners, and design an end-based, sustainable law 
enforcement capacity-building program and build capable counterterrorism partners 
while improving the nation’s entire ROL framework. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
THE CURRENT PROBLEM SPACE 
 The threat to the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad posed by international 
terrorism has changed dramatically since the United States started its global war on terror 
(GWOT) in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. While U.S. and international 
efforts in support of the GWOT were successful in targeting core Al Qaeda (AQ) 
members, and Al Qaeda senior leadership (AQSL), mainly in Afghanistan and western 
Pakistan, AQ fighters have since moved to nearly every part of the world and AQ-
inspired Jihadists have taken root throughout the Middle East and Africa. Several of the 
most prominent Al Qaeda Affiliates and Adherent (AQAA) groups are now operating 
within sovereign countries in which the type of direct military action applied effectively 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan is simply not politically, diplomatically, or logistically 
possible. 
Security operations and effective internal policing by local law enforcement (LE) 
and justice agencies to shrink or eliminate the ungoverned spaces in partner countries is 
needed to address the new generation of terrorist threats effectively, which are now 
spread around the globe and often intermingled with the civilian populations that these 
groups need to exist.  
THE MAJOR CRIMES TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN 
This mission of building capable international LE partners is not a new one for the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI was asked to take increasingly larger and 
more prominent roles in helping train both Iraqi and Afghan LE agencies. In Kabul, the 
FBI was asked to work with Afghan partners to design, build and operate an entirely new 
LE agency, the major crimes task force-Afghanistan (MCTF-A), and to use this fledgling 
task force to counter the political and financial support being funneled to the rising 
Afghan insurgency through high-level corruption. This program was, by far, the most 
ambiguous capacity-building program the FBI ever took on and it went beyond the usual 
 xiii 
template of simply making existing LE agencies more effective to creating what many 
U.S. officials dubbed “the Afghan FBI.”  
However, the results of the FBI’s efforts in Afghanistan and experiences with 
MCTF-A led to a political row at the highest levels of U.S. and Afghan governments. 
Currently, the MCTF-A essentially operates in name only, with limited investigative 
capacity and without any direct FBI assistance or involvement.1 Given the enormous 
resources devoted to this large-scale undertaking, and the apparent limited prospects for 
long-term success,2 it is unlikely the FBI would assess this program as fully successful or 
as fulfilling its intended goals. Simply saying the FBI should never take on large-scale 
capacity building programs, like the MCTF-A, or partner with foreign LE agencies to 
attempt to tackle tough criminal and terrorism-related matter, would be short-sided and 
counterproductive to the strategic interests of the United States in many countries in 
which terrorist groups are now trying to establish a safe haven. Additionally, the current 
U.S. national counterterrorism (CT) strategy places great emphasis on development of 
competent CT partnerships with countries throughout the Middle East and Africa. 
MOVING TO THE NEXT CHALLENGE 
Developing a criteria for assessing the viability of success for potential LE and 
rule of law (ROL) capacity-building programs is essential for both avoiding the missteps 
of the FBI’s experience with the MCTF-A but still working to build capable CT partners 
around the world. This thesis, through the case study of the MCTF-A and the post-
conflict environment in which it operated, develops a method and criteria for the FBI and 
its U.S. counterterrorism partners to evaluate potential host nation LE and justice sectors. 
This thesis also examines the critical elements to consider for developing a politically, 
socially, and legally sustainable framework for building LE and justice sector capacity, 
and creating a comprehensive ends-based program to improve the overarching ROL 




                                                 
framework of host nations, as well as lays out the necessary partners within the FBI and 
other U.S. government departments to create a successful ROL program. 
THE CASE FOR WHY CAPACITY BUILDING IS ESSENTIAL 
Stopping or even slowing down the spread of terrorist groups throughout the 
developing world is a daunting and challenging task. However, the FBI must be prepared 
to accomplish this task because neither the FBI nor any U.S. government agency has the 
resources or ability to fight international terrorism unilaterally. Furthermore, building a 
more robust ROL framework within partner nations will have positive and broad societal 
impacts in these countries. Well-designed and implemented capacity-building programs 
will not only help the FBI to counter imminent threats but will also help the United States 
address the underlying political, social, and cultural issues and deficiencies that allow 
terror groups to grow. Such programs are a crucial component of the long-term battle to 
defeat terrorism. 
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A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND 
The threat to the United States (U.S.) homeland and U.S. interests abroad posed 
by international terrorism has changed dramatically since the United States started its 
global war on terror (GWOT) in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Just days 
after those attacks, Congress authorized the President “to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001.”1 While U.S. and international efforts in support of the GWOT were successful in 
targeting core Al Qaeda (AQ) members and Al Qaeda senior leadership (AQSL), mainly 
in Afghanistan and western Pakistan, AQ fighters have since moved to nearly every part 
of the world and AQ-inspired Jihadists have taken root throughout the Middle East and 
Africa. Several of the most prominent Al Qaeda affiliates and adherent (AQAA) groups 
are now operating within sovereign countries where the type of direct military action that 
was applied effectively in Afghanistan and Pakistan is simply not politically, 
diplomatically, or logistically possible. 
Addressing the new and constantly evolving threats to U.S. security interests at 
home and abroad will require a different approach from the large-scale direct military 
action used against AQ and similar terrorist groups during the early years of the GWOT 
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Security and internal policing by local law enforcement and 
justice agencies in the host country are needed to address the new generation of terrorist 
threats effectively, which are now spread around the globe and often intermingled with 
the civilian populations that these groups need to exist. As the 2011 National 
Counterterrorism Strategy stated, “Assisting partners to improve and expand governance 
in select instances is also critical, including strengthening the ROL so that suspected 
terrorists can be brought to justice within a respected and transparent system.”2 
1 Pub. L. No. 107-40, S2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. S. 1541 note). 
2 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2011).  
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As recent resurgence in terrorist and insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have illustrated, establishing a robust ROL and effective law enforcement is essential to 
build a country that can maintain its own security and deal with terrorist groups 
attempting to operate within its borders. Developing, or countries that recently underwent 
significant political upheaval, are more threatened by internal violence and groups 
operating within their country than by groups from outside their borders. The principle of 
empowering a government with the law enforcement resources and other internal 
capacities needed to manage its own security effectively is one that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and other agencies within the Department of Justice (DOJ) have been 
seeking to implement for decades with international law enforcement partners. As stated 
in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study in May 2007, the DOJ believes that 
the long-term benefits of effective law enforcement capacity building are not limited to 
counterterrorism (CT) efforts.  
Many CT experts within the military, diplomatic, and academic worlds agree that 
establishing and maintaining functional and effective law enforcement and justice sector 
agencies is critical to attacking the root causes of terrorism and preventing the creation 
and development of safe havens in which terrorist groups can operate.3 These beliefs and 
sentiments led the United States to devoted billions of dollars to building justice-sector 
capacity in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2011.4 As part of the U.S. government’s justice-
sector capacity-building efforts, the FBI also invested millions of dollars and assigned 
hundreds of FBI personnel to programs designed to build Afghan investigative, 
operational, and intelligence collection capabilities and capacities.5 However, the results 
3 Garrett M. Graff, The Threat Matrix: The FBI at War in the Global War on Terror (New York: Little 
Brown and Company, 2011); Bruce Hoffman, Combating Al Qaeda and the Islamic Militant Threat 
(Washington: RAND Corporation, 2006); Jeffrey S. Davies, Understanding Law Enforcement Support to 
National Security Problem and Prospects (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, 2008). 
4 Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector 
Assistance (CRS Report No. R41484) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 
5 Graff, The Threat Matrix; Vadim Thomas, The G-Men in Kabul: The FBI Combating Public 
Corruption in Afghanistan (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2010). 
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of the FBI’s efforts in Afghanistan, in particular with regard to large-scale capacity 
building, are mixed at best, and the long-term effects of these programs are uncertain.6  
The FBI spent $4.6 million on developing an “Afghan FBI” in Afghanistan, 
named the major crimes task force-Afghanistan (MCTF-A). However, currently, the 
MCTF-A essentially operates in name only, with limited investigative capacity and 
without any direct FBI assistance or involvement.7 Given the enormous resources 
devoted to this large-scale undertaking and the apparent limited prospects for long-term 
success,8 it is unlikely the FBI would assess this program as fully successful or as 
fulfilling its intended goals.  
Despite these unsatisfactory results in Afghanistan, law enforcement and justice-
sector capacity-building programs are still viewed as effective methods for countering 
terrorist factions operating or seeking to operate in countries throughout the Middle East 
and northern Africa, and the FBI will undoubtedly continue to be asked to assist with 
such programs. This situation raises a crucial question. Might it be possible to build a set 
of doctrines or criteria by which the FBI could evaluate the potential long-term 
effectiveness of proposed U.S.-sponsored law-enforcement capacity-building programs 
before committing personnel or resources to a multi-year endeavor that may have a low 
likelihood of ongoing viability or of significantly improving U.S. security at home or 
abroad? 
Developing such criteria and using the criteria to evaluate the likelihood of 
success of proposed ROL capacity-building programs is essential to the FBI’s 
international CT mission for a variety of operational, monetary, and investigative reasons. 
First, the FBI has approximately 13,500 agents and 21,700 professional support 
6 Mark Mazzetti, “As Time Passes, the Goals in Afghanistan Shrink,” New York Times, September 11, 
2010; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Karzai Rift Prompts U.S. to Reevaluate Anti-corruption Strategy in 
Afghanistan,” Washington Post, September 13, 2010. 
7 Michael Huffman, “How the U.S. Lost the Corruption Battle in Afghanistan,” U.S. Policy in a 




                                                 
personnel,9 but only a small fraction of these staff has the ability to train CV techniques 
or broader capacity-building expertise10 and is capable of deploying to developing 
countries.11 Thus, devoting these limited personnel to the work with countries that have 
the best chances for success is required. Monetarily, the FBI does not have a dedicated 
international training cadre, and therefore, any personnel devoted to capacity-building 
efforts must be reassigned from their investigative and operational duties. Lastly, as the 
case study of the MCTF-A will demonstrate, the FBI should not be attempting to institute 
ROL programs into countries that will not be receptive to these programs, or if these 
programs run counter to the larger U.S. national security strategy for the country or 
region. 
Of the FBI’s current annual budget of approximately $8.7 billion, no money set is 
aside within the FBI’s budget for foreign capacity building programs. As with the MCTF-
A, the vast majority of the funding for these endeavors is borne by other agencies, but the 
FBI is usually responsible for its own personnel-associated costs, including not only 
regular salary and benefits but also supplementary compensation for overseas 
deployment, hazardous-duty pay, and overtime.  
Aside from the direct impact of participating in these large-scale and long-term 
capacity-building efforts on the FBI’s ability to execute its mandates in the criminal and 
national-security realms, the failure of ill-conceived or poorly implemented ROL 
capacity-building programs can have detrimental effects on the FBI’s relationship with 
(and its reputation and credibility within) the host country. The negative operational and 
investigative impacts of such a failure can be substantial and long lasting.  
Since the FBI usually partners with other U.S. departments to sponsor large-scale 
capacity-building efforts, careful consideration must be given to proposed endeavors so 
as not to damage relationships with critical U.S. partners. As has occurred in Kabul, the 
FBI’s involvement with capacity-building efforts that may appear to have broad U.S. 




                                                 
government support can actually create a wedge between the FBI and other U.S. 
departments and agencies that have divergent or competing interests or CT strategies.12 
Given its limited overseas resources, the FBI often requires the support and assistance of 
other U.S. government agencies and departments to conduct its mission.13 Entering into 
or endorsing capacity-building programs with international partners that create tension or 
disagreement with these same U.S. partners will not assist the FBI in maintaining or 
enhancing the domestic and overseas security of U.S. citizens. 
Finally, ROL capacity-building programs are an essential part of the U.S.’s 
worldwide efforts to attack not only the terrorist groups threatening the United States, but 
the underlying conditions that lead to their rise and allow them to operate. Helping 
partner nations create or improve their capacity or capability to provide security to their 
citizens and build a more robust law enforcement and justice sector will not only improve 
the internal security of the partner nation, but will also have positive effects on the region 
and will deny terrorist groups the un- or undergoverned spaces they require to exist. 
B. DATA SOURCES 
This thesis relies on a variety of sources that include open-source government 
documents, articles, and books. Substantial literature documents the U.S. government’s 
CT strategy and its desire to move away from reliance on military and direct action to 
other soft-power programs. Little research is available on the development of the MCTF-
A, but numerous analyses can be found concerning its collapse, the resulting political 
implications, and the systemic governmental corruption it was designed to counter. 
Sufficient literature examines the positive effects of improving a country’s justice 
sector system and strengthening ROL. Much of the available literature is written in the 
wake of the Afghan and Iraq wars and examines the unique challenges of building ROL 
12 Sarah Chayes, “The Afghan Bag Man,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2013; Dan Murphy, “Vast Sums 
of Aid Continue To Be Stolen in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 2012. 
13 Thomas V. Fuentes, Assistant Director, Office of International Operations, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Statement before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism 
House Homeland Security Committee, Washington, DC, October 4, 2007. 
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into post-conflict societies. Much of the available literature is created by non-
governmental organizations, think tanks, and human rights organizations. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An examination of literature useful in a case study of the MCTF-A falls into two 
main categories, works that cover the political, social, and legal environment that the 
MCTF-A was attempting to operate in, and literature that describes the actual workings 
of the task force and the political and legal implications of the MCTF-A’s work. To 
conduct a comprehensive case study of the MCTF-A, it is necessary to examine each of 
these two categories. The formation and operation of the MCTF-A did not happen in a 
vacuum and the actions of the MCTF-A, particularly concerning the investigation of 
high-ranking Afghan officials, had a direct and serious impact on the political and social 
climate of the entire country and efforts to fight the Taliban. 
No shortage of literature documents the political, social, military, and legal 
environment of Afghanistan when the MCTF-A was created in 2009. Much of the 
available open source and unclassified literature takes great effort to detail the growing 
insurgency, the threat the rise of this insurgency poses to coalition efforts in the country, 
and the Afghan government’s seemingly insatiable appetite for corruption. This type of 
literature documenting the toxic and often deadly mix of money, politics, corruption, and 
military action came from three broad primary sources: media, think tanks, and official 
U.S. government reports. 
While most literature began documenting the quagmire of Afghan and coalition 
counterinsurgency efforts after the difficulties in Iraq helped highlight the issues, one 
work of note documented the future challenges early in the conflict. Rory Stewart’s The 
Places In Between is an excellent work that describes Afghanistan’s unique social and 
political challenges. Stewart does a tremendous job laying out the challenges that face 
any military force, government, or non-government organization (NGO) that seeks to 
change or “improve” the Afghans’ views on justice or the broad concept of ROL. Stewart 
describes the players in the early days of reconstruction, the idealistic NGO workers, the 
urban Afghan government officials installed by the coalition, the “rogues” who ruled 
 6 
outside Kabul, and the average Afghan citizen who had endured 25 years of continual 
regional conflict. Stewart’s work paints a troubling picture of government officials, both 
Afghan and international, whose entire concept of Afghanistan is what they view from 
their sport utility vehicle (SUV) as they motor around Kabul, “Policymakers did not have 
the time, structures or resources for a serious study of an alien culture, They justified 
their lack of knowledge and experience by focusing on poverty and implying dramatic 
cultural differences did not exist. They acted as though villagers were interested in all the 
priorities of international organizations even though these priorities were mutually 
contradictory.”14 Stewart’s work foreshadows many of the same issues to be faced by the 
FBI and international mentors when designing and operating the MCTF-A. 
Another leading contributor to the literature describing the unique operating 
environment within Afghanistan and the challenges facing the coalition is Seth Jones. 
Along with Jones’s prolific works for RAND Corporation, testimonies to Congress, and 
books documenting American efforts in Afghanistan, Jones’s works How Terrorist 
Groups End and Establishing Law and Order After Conflict are essential for 
understanding both the importance of creating effective law enforcement after conflict 
and the daunting challenges of attempting to do it effectively. 
Articles and in-depth analyses, such as Financing the Taliban by Catherine 
Collins and Ashrah Ali, advocated that efforts to develop ROL programs along with 
expanding Afghan law enforcement’s capacity were crucial to creating a lasting victory 
in Kabul by cutting off funds going to the insurgency.15 Many academics, government 
officials, and military leaders wrote articles, op-ed pieces or drafted cables lamenting that 
military force alone was simply not enough to end the near-daily attacks on international 
troops.16 
14 Rory Stewart, The Places In Between (London: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007). 
15 Ibid.; Catherine Collins and Ashrah Ali, Financing the Taliban: Tracing the Dollars Behind the 
Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2010). 
16 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Deep Concerns on Afghan Strategy,” New York Times, 
January 25, 2010; Lauren Miller and Robert Perito, Establishing Rule of Law in Afghanistan (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2004). 
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Reporters, notably Mark Mazzetti, Joshua Partlow, and Sarah Chayes, and other 
media focused on the flow of money from international donors that was finding its way to 
Taliban and insurgent groups fighting the United States.17 Throughout the FBI’s 
involvement with the MCTF-A, reporters from many of the leading traditional media 
outlets, such as the New York Times, Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, 
devoted much coverage to documenting how Afghan government corruption was fueling 
the insurgency. Many stories and in-depth analyses were produced by media outlets that 
cited this corruption within the Afghan central government as the number-one issue 
impacting the U.S.-led coalition’s short- and long-term prospects for success in 
Afghanistan.18  
As well as traditional and Internet-based media coverage of the MCTF-A, and the 
corruption the MCTF-A was created to combat, government agencies produced open 
source reports on these topics also. The GAO, Department of Defernse (DOD) and the 
special inspector general for afghan reconstruction (SIGAR) all produced numerous 
reports documenting U.S. government efforts in the country and the region. Of particular 
interest is SIGAR since it began publishing quarterly reports and special investigations to 
Congress on the progress the United States. was making in Afghanistan and the 
continuing challenges of reconstruction in 2008. One of these reports, U.S. Agencies 
Have Provided Training and Support to Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force, but 
Reporting and Reimbursement Issues Need to be Addressed , dealt directly with the 
MCTF-A and was very useful in documenting the inner workings of the MCTF-A and its 
efforts to train and mentor Afghan investigators.  
One interesting aspect of the review of literature surrounding the MCTF-A is that 
the tone of literature concerning the task force and the entirety of U.S. anti-corruption 
efforts distinctly changed after the arrest of Mohammed Zia Salehi, a close personal 
advisor to President Karzai. Following the Salehi arrest, nearly all U.S. and Western 
media sources, in particular the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and New York 
Times, represented the MCTF-A in a very positive light but claimed that it had been 
17 Mazzetti, “As Time Passes”; Chayes, “The Afghan Bag Man.” 
18 Thomas, The G-Men in Kabul: The FBI Combating Public Corruption in Afghanistan. 
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outmaneuvered in Karzai’s effort to protect his corrupt cronies.19 Western media alleged, 
moreover, that Washington and the rest of the international community lacked the 
political will to stand up to Karzai and fight high-level corruption.20 At this point, many 
within the media, along with U.S. military and civilian officials alike, perceived that the 
U.S.’s overarching corruption plan had backfired, that all “Afghan corruption inquiries 
[were] frozen,”21 and that the MCTF-A’s efforts had been essentially wasted.22  
D. OUTPUT 
This thesis should serve as a primer and blueprint for senior and mid-level FBI 
executives considering programs to build the law enforcement and ROL capacities of 
foreign partners. It outlines the potential benefits and risks to U.S. national security 
involved in helping a country to create a more robust and capable law enforcement and 
justice sector. By educating the highly transient FBI senior leadership regarding previous 
experiences in capacity-building programs, this thesis can help to ensure that previous 
bad decisions are not replicated and that best practices are repeated. By using the 
aforementioned case study, this thesis attempts to create a set of criteria that FBI 
policymakers should examine before committing FBI resources or the FBI brand to 
building the capacity of CT partners. 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The crux of this thesis is a thorough case study of the MCTF-A’s efforts to 
counter the growing terrorist threat posed by the rising insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Guiding questions include the following: What were the cultural, political, societal, and 
judicial influences that led to the MCTF-A’s outcome? Would a thorough examination of 
these factors in advance have been able to predict with reasonable confidence the 
19 Chayes, “The Afghan Bag Man.” 
20 Huffman, “How the U.S. Lost the Corruption Battle in Afghanistan”; Strobel and Taylor, “U.S. 
Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign.” 
21 Rod Nordland and Alissa Rubin, “New Afghan Corruption Inquiries Frozen,” New York Times, 
September 14, 2010. 
22 Mazzetti, “As Time Passes”; Huffman, “How the U.S. Lost the Corruption Battle in Afghanistan.” 
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eventual outcome of the MCTF-A, or did other dynamics that impacted the result evolve 
subsequently?  
The thesis does not focus on each individual international terrorist threat facing 
the United States but will view the terrorist threat as a phenomena that arises due to 
known political, social, and cultural influences. This thesis attempts to present 
recommendations that serve to help resolve one of the main factors that terrorist and 
insurgent groups use to build their popularity with their client population, illegitimacy of 
host governments due to the lack of ROL. 
This thesis does not cover the many classified FBI-DOD joint programs designed 
to help this nation’s partner countries fight terrorism within their countries. It also does 
not discuss any operational programs. Rather, it focuses on the FBI’s role as trainer and 
mentor of foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  
F. UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II presentS a thorough case study of the MCTF-A. This case study 
examineS the conditions that led to the agreement between General Petraeus and FBI 
Director Mueller to create the “Afghan FBI,” the creation of the MCTF-A, its successful 
early months of operation, and the eventual stalemate that came once the task force 
started building the corruption cases it was designed to investigate. The case study also 
presentS the training and vetting process to train the Afghan investigators and the day-to-
day difficulties faced by the FBI and international mentors trying to build the MCTF-A 
into a successful law enforcement agency. 
Chapter II also documents and analyzes the political, social, cultural, and legal 
causes of the course the MCTF-A took from its inception in 2009 until the FBI withdrew 
from daily support of the task force in 2012. This chapter also presents the two sides of 
the U.S.’s own strategy in Afghanistan and how the MCTF-A came to be between the 
two opposing U.S. political factions and their distinctly different vision for U.S. 
involvement in Afghanistan and the region. 
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Chapter III presents recommendations for the development of criteria the FBI 
should work with the U.S. government inter-agency to assess potential CT partner 
countries’ political, social, legal, and cultural framework. The criteria are based on 
experiences of the MCTF-A, and other ROL capacity-building programs promoted and 
run by other U.S. government agencies. This chapter also lays out political, legal, and 
societal considerations when devising, designing, and implementing ROL capacity-
building programs around the world. 
Chapter IV states the case for why capacity building, despite the FBI’s experience 
with the MCTF-A, and the daunting task of designing, creating, and implementing a 
successful ROL capacity-building program, should be a key component of the U.S. 
government’s, and specifically, the FBI’s worldwide long-term CT strategy. This chapter 
also examines the second-order positive effects on a partner country’s societal, political, 
and legal framework through strengthening the country’s ROL and building law 
enforcement and justice capacity. 
Chapter V summarizes key findings from the case study of the MCTF-A and 
reiterates recommendations presented in previous chapters for future capacity building 
endeavors. These recommendations combine the need for the United States and the FBI 
to continue ROL capacity-building efforts in post-conflict and developing countries to 
strengthen U.S. CT efforts while applying lessons learned from the MCTF-A.  
 11 
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II. “A KEY ELEMENT OF THE ROAD MAP”23 A CASE STUDY 
OF THE MAJOR CRIMES TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN 
The FBI has a long history of providing advanced training and mentoring to 
foreign police services and internal security services. The FBI is one of the most 
respected law enforcement agencies in the world and is at the cutting edge of developing 
advanced technologies and investigative techniques. As such, the FBI often shares its 
expertise and experience with other developed nations and nations trying to enhance their 
police and intelligence collection procedures, capabilities and capacities further. Many of 
the FBI’s most active partners for capacity and capability building efforts are western and 
eastern European countries and other Western nations that share similar legal, cultural, 
and political frameworks. 
However, following the attacks on September 11, 2001, it became increasingly 
evident that many of the most serious threats to U.S. national security interests were not 
directly coming from the types of countries the FBI had spent significant time and effort 
partnering with in the recent decades. As was pointed out by many inside and outside of 
the U.S. government, the greatest threats to U.S. national security came from weak or 
failing states not strong or developed ones. Additionally, it became evident following the 
U.S. invasions of both Iraq and Afghanistan that large-scale international efforts were 
needed to help reform the law enforcement system in Iraq. In addition, the entire law 
enforcement and justice systems would need rebuilt in Afghanistan. To help fight the 
growing insurgency in Afghanistan, and to give the nascent central government in Kabul 
the legitimacy needed to fight back the challenges from the Taliban, it was evident some 
form of justice system and functional law enforcement was necessary. 
The FBI chose to enter into a capacity-building endeavor in Afghanistan that was 
far beyond the scale and scope of any previous FBI capacity-building programs. The FBI 
essentially signed on to create an entirely new investigative entity, and to train and 
mentor a law enforcement force larger than most police departments in the United States. 
23 “Major Crimes Task Force: A Key Element of the Road Map,” State Department cable, October 26, 
2009. 
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While it was undoubted that the FBI had the requisite expertise and subject matter 
expertise to accomplish this task, it would become evident within months of starting this 
endeavor that building ROL capacity in countries that do not share a common cultural or 
legal history would present challenges the FBI had never faced previously. Also, the FBI 
would find itself wedged between two groups of adherents of starkly opposing national 
security doctrines neither of which fully appreciated the ramifications of building law 
enforcement capacity when many of the largest and highest-ranking crooks were key U.S. 
partners in Kabul. 
The main problems that faced the FBI and its international partners attempting to 
improve and expand Afghanistan’s law enforcement and justice system fell into three 
broad categories: social or cultural, legal, and political. Some or all of these categories or 
problems and challenges would be represented throughout the different phases of the 
MCTF-A. An examination of different phases of the MCTF-A and how these problems 
were present in these phases, and how these challenges manifested themselves leading to 
the ultimate withdrawal of the FBI from the MCTF-A, follow. 
A. THE AFGHAN BATTLE SPACE IN WHICH THE MCTF-A WAS 
DESIGNED TO OPERATE  
The MCTF-A was a ROL capacity-building program purpose built to counter the 
rising insurgency challenging the legitimacy of the Afghan government installed and 
supported by the United States and its international partners (the coalition). This growing 
insurgency, the largest portion of which was comprised of Taliban fighters, did not 
simply spring up in the Spring 2009 when the idea for standing up the MCTF-A was 
brokered between the FBI and DOD. The history of the U.S. involvement in the current 
Afghan conflict was years old and the reasons the insurgency was growing stronger while 
the coalition and its Afghan partners were facing stiffer resistance are complex and often 
inter-related.  
The United States and its international partners began military actions within 
Afghanistan to target AQ and its Taliban hosts on October 7, 2001, 27 days after the 
attacks on New York and Washington, DC of September 11, 2001. U.S. and coalition 
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forces quickly overran the ruling Taliban and the foreign fighters who had traveled to 
Afghanistan to fight the U.S. and its partners. Within six weeks, coalition forces and their 
Afghan partners, the Northern Alliance, had captured the Afghan capital of Kabul. It took 
roughly another month for U.S. and Afghan forces, some of them led by future Afghan 
President Hamid Karzai, to capture the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, effectively 
taking military control of the country.  
From the fall of Kandahar in late 2001 until the autumn of 2008, U.S. operations 
focused mainly on the military targeting of Taliban and AQ leaders and cells. While 
much of the U.S. military focus was on managing the 2003 invasion of Iraq and putting 
down the AQ-inspired insurgency that followed during this period, the growing 
popularity and acceptance of the Taliban and the emergence of other like-minded groups, 
such as the Haqqani Network, was undermining the ability of the Afghan government to 
accept responsibility for security operations throughout the country or to police most 
parts of the country effectively. The number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan grew gradually 
from about 5,200 at the beginning of 2002 to just over 30,000 in late 2008.24 While U.S. 
troop levels rose steadily, the increase of international troops did not keep pace, which 
forced the United States to take on greater responsibility for fighting the insurgency and 
rebuilding the Afghan government.25 Of the more than 50 countries that supported 
Operation Enduring Freedom in the first year of the war,26 only the United States and 
Great Britain still had more than 5,000 troops in Afghanistan by 2009.27 
Upon being promoted to the position of Commander, United States Forces-
Afghanistan, international security assistance force (ISAF) in June 2009, General Stanley 
McChrystal immediately began stating publicly that 30,000 to 40,000 additional U.S. 
troops were needed in Afghanistan to fight the growing insurgency and the spread of 
24 Amy Belasco, Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghan Wars, 2002–2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues 
(CRS Report No. R40682) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009). 
25 Ibid. 
26 David Gerleman and Jennifer Stevens, Operation Enduring Freedom: Foreign Pledges of Military 
and Intelligence Support (CRS Order Code RL31152) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2001). 
27 Simon Rogers and Lisa Evans, “Afghanistan Troop Numbers Data: How Many Does Each Country 
Send to the NATO Mission There?” The Guardian, June 14, 2011. 
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Taliban influence.28 In a memo dated August 30, 2009, to Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates, McChrystal indicated that an entirely new strategy was needed to defeat the 
insurgency threatening the Afghan government.29 In a classified memo that was leaked 
and then later declassified,30 McChrystal strongly advocated for a whole-of-government 
approach, and contended that joint civilian-military effort would be required to achieve 
victory in Afghanistan.31 Within the memo, he stated repeatedly that one of the key 
factors fueling the rising insurgency and propelling recent insurgent gains was the effect 
of unpunished corruption at all levels within the Afghan government. This claim seems 
supported by a 2009 OXFAM study according to which 48 percent of Afghans polled 
saw corruption and the ineffective Afghan government as the main causes of the current 
conflict.32  
Along with claims that money being siphoned off from international aid and 
military contracts was being rerouted to Taliban commanders and local power brokers,33 
U.S. military and diplomatic leaders expressed deep concern that the corruption of 
Afghan officials was undermining the legitimacy of the entire Afghan government; 
thereby, causing the Afghan population to turn to the Taliban shadow governments 
working within the provinces.34 From January to April 2009, insurgent attacks were up 
64 percent from the previous year,35 improvised explosive device (IED) attacks were up 
28 Scott Wilson, “McChrystal Faulted on Troop Statements,” Washington Post, October 5, 2009; Ann 
Scott Tyson, “U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Calls Situation Serious,” Washington Post, September 1, 
2009. 
29 Erik Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “General McChrystal Asks Obama for More Troops,” New York 
Times, September 20, 2009. 
30 Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: More Forces or Mission Failure,” Washington Post, September 21, 
2009. 
31 Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment,” Washington Post, August 30, 2009. 
32 OXFAM International, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict 1978–2009 (Oxford, 
United Kingdom: OXFAM International, 2009). 
33 Global Post, “Who is Funding the Afghan Taliban? You Don’t Want to Know,” Reuters, August 13, 
2009. 
34 McChrystal, “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment.” 
35 Anthony Cordesman, The Afghan War at End 2009: A Crisis and New Realism (Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, revised version, January 7, 2010). 
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80 percent,36 and attacks on Afghan government officials and offices were up 90 
percent.37 More worrisome, only 35 percent of Afghans felt that security was better than 
in 2008,38 and for the first time since the invasion, more Afghans had an unfavorable 
view of U.S. forces than in the previous year.39 Further polls, along with statistics 
released by the ISAF, indicated that the number of attacks on coalition forces was rising, 
the effectiveness and size of these attacks were growing, and support for ISAF among the 
Afghan population was at its lowest point and was expected to continue dropping.40 
The rising number of attacks, a growing lack of support from Afghans for U.S. 
and ISAF efforts, and the widely held view that corruption had permeated all levels of 
Afghan government, all pointed to a need to reassess the current battle plan for defeating 
the Taliban and their allies.41 As McChrystal stated in his memo, “[C]riminality creates a 
pool of manpower, resources, and capabilities for insurgents and contributes to a 
pervasive sense of insecurity among the people. … A number of Afghan government 
officials are reported to be complicit in these activities further undermining GoIRA 
[Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] credibility.” Admiral Mike 
Mullins, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated bluntly in November 2009, “If we 
don’t get a level of legitimacy and governance, then all the troops in the world aren’t 
going to make a difference. … [Karzai] has got to take concrete steps to eliminate 
corruption … that means that you have to rid yourself of those who are corrupt and you 
have to actually arrest and prosecute them.”42 Along with these types of statements from 
Obama administration officials and the information leaked within the McChrystal memo, 
numerous studies assessing the current state of the Afghan conflict urged efforts to 





41 The White House, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group Report on U.S. Policy Towards 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Washington, DC: The White House, 2009).  




                                                 
increase the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and thereby, enhance its ability to 
govern effectively and counter the growing view of its illegitimacy fueling the insurgency 
throughout the country.43 To establish the government’s legitimacy and demonstrate its 
commitment to the ROL, U.S. and international officials advocated tackling corruption.44  
Based on the need to counter this dual threat to the Afghan mission—from 
insurgent attacks, which were increasing in both frequency and effectiveness, and from 
growing popular displeasure in Afghanistan with the central government and its 
international backers,45 the U.S. government proposed several efforts to strengthen the 
ROL within the Afghan government. Multiple U.S. government departments and 
agencies were tasked to lend assistance, expertise, and training,46 and many others 
volunteered to assist with the so-called “civilian uplift.”47 Opinion pieces and editorials 
from former and current diplomats, political leaders, and generals advocated holding the 
Afghan government, at its highest levels, accountable for policing and prosecuting 
corruption within its ranks. To highlight the point and to punctuate the U.S. commitment 
to countering corruption, President Obama met with Afghan President Karzai in early 
May 2009 to convey the new strategy for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan,48 and publicly 
admonished Karzai to address seriously the corruption within his administration.49 
By mid-2009, the United States had installed new leaders of the military and 
civilian efforts in Afghanistan (General McChrystal and Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, 
respectively) and declared a new strategy in Afghanistan. This strategy would focus on 
43 Anthony H. Cordesman, Legitimacy and the Afghan Elections (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2009). 
44 Ibid.; McChrystal, “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment.” 
45 Cordesman, The Afghan War at End 2009. 
46 Wyler and Katzman, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance. 
47 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, The U.S. Civilian Uplift in 
Afghanistan has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its Management and 
Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other Agencies (Arlington, VA: Office of the Special Inspector 
General for Afghan Reconstruction, 2011).  
48 The White House, Remarks by the President after the Trilateral Meeting with President Karzai of 
Afghanistan and President Zardari of Pakistan (Washington, DC: The White House, 2009). 
49 Helene Cooper and Jeff Zeleny, “Obama Warns Karzai to Focus on Tackling Corruption,” New 
York Times, November 2, 2009. 
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six key objectives, one of which was “[p]romoting a more capable, accountable, and 
effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually 
function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.”50 The 
new White House strategy also made recommendations, such as promoting civilian 
assistance and mentorship along with building the capacity and capability of Afghan 
police and security forces that favored civilian and diplomatic approaches to building a 
functional and legitimate Afghan government capable of acting as a willing partner in 
countering the Taliban. 
1. The Afghan FBI 
To tackle both the rampant Afghan government corruption and put a civilian face 
on reconstruction and capacity-building efforts instead of continuing the reliance on 
military personnel, the DOD turned to the FBI. In 2009, the DOD and the FBI signed an 
agreement under which the FBI would provide personnel, training, and expertise to 
support the MCTF-A.51 The MCTF-A was modeled after a similar effort created in 
Baghdad in 2005, the Major Crimes Task Force-Iraq (MCTF-I).52 However, the scale of 
the plan for the MCTF-A was much more ambitious than that for the MCTF-I, and the 
FBI would rely largely on DOD funding.53 While coordination and approval for the 
creation of the MCTF-A was handled, on the Afghan side, at the ministerial-level, it is 
highly unlikely a decision of this order would have been made without discussion and 
ultimate approval of President Karzai or his most senior advisers. 
The MCTF-A was to be led by the FBI, and the FBI would provide the largest 
portion of mentors, but law enforcement personnel from a wide variety of other 
50 The White House, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group Report on U.S. Policy Towards 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
51 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, U.S. Agencies Have Provided 
Training and Support to Afghanistan’s Major Crimes Task Force, but Reporting and Reimbursement Issues 
Need to be Addressed (Arlington, VA: Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, 
2011). 
52 Department of Justice, Major Crimes Task Force (Washington, DC: Department of Justice), 
accessed April 5, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/archive/iraq/mctf.htm. 
53 “Mission Afghanistan: Major Crimes Task Force,” accessed September 1, 2014, http://www.fbi. 
gov/news/videos/major-crimes-task-force.  
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international policing and investigative agencies would also participate.54 The plan called 
for approximately 15 FBI agents and 20 to 25 U.S. and international law enforcement 
professionals to mentor approximately 250 Afghan investigators from both the Ministry 
of Interior and the National Directorate of Security, two groups that had historically not 
worked together.55 The MCTF-A’s launch marked the first instance of Afghanistan’s 
police (part of the Ministry of Interior (MOI)) being co-located and operationally 
integrated with its internal security service (the National Directorate of Security 
(NDS)).56  
Both U.S. military and diplomatic leaders roundly lauded the creation of the 
MCTF-A as a major step forward in creating an atmosphere of accountability within the 
Afghan government.57 The announcement of the MCTF-A was timed to coincide with a 
strongly worded statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in which she publicly 
called on President Karzai to start taking responsibility for corruption within his 
administration.58 In a harbinger of future disputes with U.S. officials concerning the 
MCTF-A, Karzai denied the accusations of corruption and rebuked the United States for 
interfering with internal Afghan matters. 
Many within the U.S. government saw the MCTF-A as the best chance to date to 
create a mechanism for fighting corruption at the highest levels of the Afghan 
government and to finally start to stem the unchecked flow of cash to the Taliban and 
other insurgent leaders.59 As evidenced in an October 26, 2009 cable from Ambassador 
Eikenberry, the United States was counting on the MCTF-A to play a major role in 
building law-enforcement capacity and advancing larger U.S. goals: “The MCTF is an 
54 “Mission Afghanistan: Major Crimes Task Force.” 
55 Ibid. 
56 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, U.S. Agencies Have Provided 
Training and Support. 
57 “Major Crimes Task Force: A Key Element of the Road Map.”  
58 Mark Landler, “Clinton Presses Karzai on Corruption on Eve of Inauguration,” New York Times, 
November 18, 2009. 
59 Jon Boone, “NATO Task Force to Form Afghan FBI and Root Out High Level Corruption,” The 
Guardian, November 15, 2009. 
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emerging interagency and international cooperation success story with the MCTF playing 
a pivotal role in U.S. and Afghan anti-corruption efforts.”60 
Thus, before ever opening a single investigation or training the first Afghan MOI 
officer, U.S. leaders in Washington and Kabul were already looking to the MCTF-A and 
its FBI mentors to produce big results and quick successes. These expectations and desire 
for quick and public results countering the perceived rampant corruption within the 
Afghan central government would be a main driver of the MCTF-A’s creation and would 
have a direct impact on the aggressiveness with which MCTF-A investigators built and 
pursued cases.  
2. Analysis: Cultural Implications of the MCTF-A and Rule of Law 
Capacity Building 
Based on the problem set previously defined and the desire to not only build the 
legitimacy of the Afghan central government so that coalition forces could prepare to 
begin withdrawing from their duties required for security and stability, and to counter the 
rising insurgent threat leading to a near daily increase in attacks on U.S. and international 
forces, the creation and strengthening of existing ROL and law enforcement solutions 
was an obvious and logical step. However, building a centrally administered justice 
system and increasing law enforcement investigative capacity, particularly in regards to 
the investigation of what Western nations define as corruption, overlooks two 
fundamental cultural concepts in Afghanistan, alternate justice solutions and criminal 
patronage networks. 
a. Alternative Justice Solutions 
Rule of law was defined earlier as the state’s monopolization of the means of 
violence to ensure that its citizens turn to the state to handle criminal matters between 
individuals. This definition implies the presence of a sufficiently strong state-run 
government that either manages and administers the process centrally or shares authority 
with constituent political units (such as states or provinces). The recent history of 
60 “Major Crimes Task Force: A Key Element of the Road Map.” 
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Afghanistan shows that a government capable of effectively centrally managing or 
coordinating the administration of justice through constituent units has been absent for 
generations.61 The ethnic, political, and geographic divides present in Afghanistan, along 
with the people’s religious beliefs, have tended to make the Afghan people more reliant 
on and inclined to trust local justice solutions rather than state-run institutions.62  
Additionally, the international coalition’s early efforts to prop up a weak Hamid 
Karzai and mollifying the warlords and power brokers who could potentially challenge 
his authority and legitimacy in Kabul only strengthened this tendency.63 By backing 
warlords whom the Afghan population feared or reviled as much as or more than they 
feared the Taliban leaders, and by making the central government in Kabul reliant upon 
these warlords to maintain stability within their local areas,64 ISAF and United Nations 
(UN) officials only furthered the “weak-state-strong-society” reality on the ground.65 
One UN official derisively called this process “bribery for peace”66 and a North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) representative, as noted previously, termed it “keeping the 
warlords happy.”67 
Based on the inability of the Kabul-based central government to influence affairs 
outside Kabul without the assistance of these warlords, and because these warlords 
viewed the placing of corrupt cronies in police and judicial positions as a means of 
rewarding allies and further building their patronage network, Afghans increasingly 
turned to local jirgas (traditional civil courts made up of village elders) and even the 
61 U.S. Department of State, Report of Inspection: Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan (Report ISP-
I-08-09) (Washington, DC: 2008. 
62 Ali Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” Crime, Law and Social Change 
41 (2004): 319–41. 
63 John Braithwaite and Ali Wardak, “Crime and War in Afghanistan, Part 1: The Hobbesian 
Solution,” British Journal of Criminology 53, no. 2 (2013): 179–196. 
64 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Afghanistan (Vienna, Austria: United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012). 
65 John Hooker, A Cross-Cultural View of Corruption (Pittsburgh, PA.: Carnegie Mellon University, 
2003). 
66 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Afghanistan. 
67 Braithwaite and Wardak, “Crime and War in Afghanistan, Part 1.” 
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Taliban for the civil justice that they were unable to find in state-run institutions.68 
Taliban leaders highlighted the inability of state-run institutions to administer justice 
services and the corruption of police and justice officials who viewed their jobs only as a 
mechanism for soliciting bribes, they seized upon public awareness of these systemic 
weaknesses to create a “shadow” system of justice.69 Taliban courts even tried other 
Taliban members against whom local citizens brought complaints, and they used 
ombudsman-like positions to ensure a fair and equitable enforcement of the code of 
conduct by Taliban “judges.”70 The Taliban and the Sharia law courts they administered 
proved to be more responsive to citizen complaints and more effective at carrying out 
sentences, although often in brutal methods.71 In areas in which the Taliban had 
established a parallel justice system, Afghans were more likely to indicate that they felt 
more secure and optimistic than those in areas solely administered by state-run 
institutions.72 
Along with the Sharia law based courts set up by the Taliban in many areas, the 
most prominent and respected method of legal and dispute resolution were the local 
jirgas. A poll of Afghans found that many mechanisms for addressing a civil or legal 
dispute (jirgas, district authorities, police, mullahs, members of parliament, non-
governmental organizations, and foreign forces), the local jirgas were the most 
commonly preferred choice; they garnered 42 percent support in 2010, the year when the 
MCTF-A became operational, and 66 percent in 2011.73 Jirgas received higher approval 
ratings in accessibility, fairness, following societal norms, effectiveness in delivering 
justice, and timeliness than all other mechanisms or institutions.74 The broad conclusion 
reached of much of the research conducted prior to the U.S. invasion and through 2011 
68 U.S. Department of State, Report of Inspection: Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan. 
69 Antonio Giustozzi, Claudio Franco, and Adam Baczko, Shadow Justice: How the Taliban Run Their 
Judiciary (Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, 2013), 33. 
70 U.S. Department of State, Report of Inspection: Rule of Law Programs in Afghanistan. 
71 Ibid. 
72 John Braithwaite and Ali Wardak, “Crime and War in Afghanistan, Part 2: A Jeffersonian 




                                                 
was that lower-level, society-based means of addressing justice concerns were the most 
effective and respected among Afghans.75 In short, the Western idea of ROL and the 
traditional justice concepts and institutions touted by international politicians had no 
relevance to the 80 percent of Afghans who live outside Afghanistan’s few large cities.76 
b. Criminal Patronage Networks  
Criminal patronage networks (CPNs) are groups of individuals, businesses, and 
often government officials that seek to control either areas of the country, state assets, or 
public or private services or contracts.77 These CPNs act in many ways like organized 
crime syndicates within the United States, and derive much of their profits from public 
corruption, such as skimming revenue from airports and other entry points, using public 
resources for private gain, extortion payments taken from citizens of the area, or from 
commercial, non-governmental, or government entities operating in the area of their 
control.78 
Due to Afghanistan’s history of warlordism, and the lack of a central government 
capable of extending its reach much beyond Kabul, Afghan politicians have favored 
building or allowing the existence of CPNs to extend their power base.79 The lifeblood of 
any CPN is a constant influx of cash or industrial activity into its area of control from 
which it can extort a percentage as revenue or gain financial benefit in other ways. As 
enormous amounts of money flowed into Afghanistan from international donors—a 
reported $103 billion in non-military U.S. aid since 200280—a large percentage of this 
money was lost to corruption and CPNs.81 The percentage siphoned off is unknown but 
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estimates range from 20 to 50 percent of every dollar spent in Afghanistan. Even 
assuming accuracy of the lowest estimate, $20 billion of non-military international aid 
donated from 2002 to 2013 has ended up in the hands of CPNs, which provided 
handsome support for the corruption and insurgency frequently tied to these networks.  
President Karzai’s late brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, was often reported to be one 
such power broker. He controlled vast areas of southern Afghanistan, where his large and 
far-reaching CPN was based. The case of Ahmed Wali Karzai amply demonstrates how 
such power brokers and warlords are both sought out and despised by U.S. officials 
trying to shape actions in Afghanistan. Although Wali Karzai was widely known to 
control much of southern Afghanistan around Kandahar and to gain considerable profit 
through corrupt practices,82 the United States could not come to a consensus on the best 
way to deal with him. U.S. military leaders often called for placing him on their target 
list,83 but it is also widely believed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employed 
Karzai to help execute their objectives in the south, and just two weeks before his 
assassination, U.S. diplomatic officials were publicly talking about him as the likely next 
governor of Kandahar.84 
B. STANDING UP THE MCTF-A: FASTER AND BIGGER RESULTS THAN 
EVER EXPECTED  
The MCTF-A was officially established in October 2009, and construction of its 
physical headquarters began on a former Soviet-era base run by the State Department’s 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and named Camp 
Falcon. Construction of housing, classrooms, training facilities, and office space for both 
the FBI and international mentors along with the Afghan investigators was complete 
enough to be occupied by January 2010.85 FBI Director Robert Mueller, U.S. Deputy 
Ambassador to Afghanistan Francis Ricciardone, UK Chargé d’Affaires Thomas Dodd, 
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and Afghan Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Attmar, inaugurated the MCTF-A 
facilities at Camp Falcon on February 25. The number of FBI and international law 
enforcement personnel stationed at the camp began to grow slowly through spring 2010.  
Afghan investigators were assigned to and trained at the MCTF-A throughout the 
next few months. While the Afghan investigators were ready to report to the MCTF-A 
much earlier, the vetting process insisted upon by the FBI, in response to the rising 
number of “Green-on-Blue” attacks on U.S. trainers,86 precluded the Afghans from 
reporting to the MCTF-A or having access to Camp Falcon before fingerprinting, 
background screening, and a polygraph test were completed. These vetting procedures, 
more stringent than those used for any other U.S.-sponsored police or security forces 
training program, were an ongoing point of contention between Afghan officials and their 
FBI trainers. FBI officials often referred to these vetting procedures as a “red line” for 
keeping the FBI involved in mentoring MCTF-A personnel, due to the number of attacks 
sustained by Afghan trainees and their American trainers throughout Afghanistan.87 No 
attacks either by Afghans assigned to the MCTF-A or insurgents targeting U.S. personnel 
were aimed at Camp Falcon while the FBI was mentoring MCTF-A investigators. 
The MCTF-A was divided into three investigative units—the corruption 
investigation unit, kidnapping unit, and the organized crime unit—but American and 
international partners viewed the primary specialty as targeting high-level corruption 
within the Afghan government.88 Almost immediately, the MCTF-A began showing 
signs of promise in addressing the rampant corruption problems that top U.S. officials 
including President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Senator John Kerry,89 and 
many others were describing frequently as a crucial issue in Afghanistan.90 
86 Bill Roggio and Lisa Lundquist, “Green-on-Blue Attacks in Afghanistan: The Data,” Long War 
Journal, August 5, 2014. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Boone, “NATO Task Force to Form Afghan FBI.” 
89 Abdul Hadi Mayar, “Will Kabul’s New Anti-Corruption Task Force Establish Itself as Afghan 
FBI?” China View, November 17, 2009. 
90 Rod Nordland and Dexter Filkins, “Antigraft Units, Backed by U.S., Draw Karzai’s Ire,” New York 
Times, August 6, 2010. 
 26 
                                                 
The first arrest attributed to the MCTF-A occurred within days of its creation in 
October 2009.91 Within just weeks of the MCTF-A’s creation, MOI and NDS 
investigators had built dozens of corruption cases, several of which resulted in the arrest 
of high-ranking Afghan officials.92 As investigators were trained, and more investigators 
were trained to a higher degree of investigative skill, the number of cases prepared for 
prosecution continued to expand. 
The MCTF-A soon became a shining example of U.S. efforts to support the two-
pronged “Obama doctrine” in Afghanistan; hold the Afghan government accountable for 
policing corruption, and provide a large civilian-led effort to teach Afghans to investigate 
governmental corruption themselves.93 Soon, U.S. diplomats and politicians began 
visiting the MCTF-A to show their support and to hear about the task force’s success in 
building a sizable caseload just months after being created. In roughly its first year of 
operation, the MCTF-A conducted 83 investigations, 43 of which were corruption-
related.94 The MCTF-A became the favorite illustration for Obama administration 
representatives, along with senior State Department and military officials, when they 
were questioned on what the United States was doing to counter the billions of dollars 
reportedly being siphoned off from international aid and taken to Dubai by Afghan 
officials and businessmen.95 Even the Obama administration’s highest-ranking diplomat 
for Afghanistan, Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, 
highlighted the MCTF-A’s efforts in testimony before Congress in 2010 when attempting 
to convince House oversight committee members to continue funding Afghan aid 
projects.96 
In the early months of MCTF-A operation, MCTF-A investigators and their FBI 
mentors took their initial mandate from Washington and targeted high-level corruption 
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and arrested increasingly high-ranking Afghan government officials. Border police 
official Brigadier General (BG) Saifullah Hakim, former minister of the Hajj and 
religious affairs Mohammad Siddiq Chakari, and Herat border commander BG Malham 
Pohanyar, were all arrested and charged within the first few months of MCTF-A 
operation. These individuals were not just high-ranking officials; each one had a direct 
connection or relationship with President Karzai. Following these investigative 
breakthroughs, MCTF-A investigators and their international partners began searching 
for even higher-ranking officials to target to seek to prove the commitment to cleaning up 
the Afghan government at every level.97 The speed and ease with which the MCTF-A 
was succeeding in targeting high-level corruption was a surprise to many senior officials 
within the DOD and Department of State (DOS). 
The surprising part of the MCTF-A’s early successes was the ease of building 
cases.98 The sister unit of the MCTF-A, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)–
led sensitive investigations unit (SIU), was tasked with attacking Afghanistan’s rampant 
drug trade and with cutting off funding to the Taliban and other insurgent groups 
generated by profits from this illicit activity. To accomplish this task, SIU and its DEA 
leaders set up a large wiretapping system, similar to that used in the United States, and 
began targeting the telephone and wireless communications of Afghan subjects.99 As one 
unnamed U.S. law enforcement official stated in late 2010, “We looked around and 
realized how deep all this ran. The corruption went from the top [of the government] to 
the bottom.”100 The wiretapping system led to increasing numbers of cases against 
Afghan officials soliciting or discussing bribes, individuals seeking to curry favor with 
them, and Taliban commanders whom these officials were paying off for their support.101 
While U.S. diplomats and policymakers all knew that considerable corruption existed 
within the Afghan government, no one guessed that it was as high-level or pervasive as 
97 “Afghan Corruption Prosecutor: I Was Forced Out,” August 28, 2010. 
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the investigations and wiretapping showed it to be.102 As the potential number of 
corruption-related cases seemed limitless, MCTF-A investigators and their FBI mentors 
continued to focus on the upper levels of government to seek to demonstrate that no one 
was too powerful to avoid their gaze.103 With the nearly immediate success of the 
MCTF-A, numerous other DOD-led anti-corruption task forces, such as the combined 
joint inter-agency task force (CJIATF) 435, TF 2010, and TF Shafafiyet, were set up to 
target both governmental and private corrupt practices. 
As the MCTF-A investigations aimed closer to President Karzai’s inner circle and 
as arrests became public, Karzai became increasingly combative toward U.S. officials 
and Afghans involved with the MCTF-A.104 Karzai began privately directing his ire 
toward Afghan officials, such as Attorney General Mohammad Ishaq Aloko, while 
publicly he criticized international interference in Afghan internal affairs. Those two 
words, “international interference,” became Karzai’s frequent refrain during the first year 
of the MCTF-A when U.S. officials publicly pressed him to address corruption seriously 
within his government or when one of his political allies was arrested for accepting 
bribes.105 In March 2010, Obama paid an unannounced visit to Kabul to tell Karzai 
personally that the United States expected him to make serious strides in changing the 
culture of corruption within the Afghan government and that such action was essential to 
maintaining good U.S.-Afghan relations.106 The U.S.-Karzai relationship was quickly 
falling apart due to the differing views on the importance and nature of the corruption 
problem in Kabul.107 It would only get worse in the months to come. Just days after the 
Obama-Karzai meeting, and their tense joint press conference, Karzai accused 
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“foreigners” of interfering in the disputed 2009 presidential election and stated that he 
may join the Taliban due to the West’s constant interference in Afghan affairs.108 
Although Karzai’s reactions showed that he was being pushed to the limit and 
was beginning to act in ways counter to the stated U.S. goals in Afghanistan, U.S. 
officials kept pushing the corruption issue through the MCTF-A and a myriad of other 
DoS and DOD-sponsored anti-corruption and good-governance task forces.109 To reduce 
the tension between Karzai and the Obama administration, a White House visit was 
scheduled and administration officials began to publicly praise Karzai as a “good 
partner.”110 However, while policymakers and top officials began to soften their public 
stance on Karzai, the newly appointed commander in Afghanistan, General David 
Petraeus, made attacking corruption and the funding that it provided to the Taliban his 
top priority.111 Petraeus began holding near-daily meetings with Karzai in early summer 
2010, at which corruption within the government was frequently discussed.112  
Meanwhile, the MCTF-A was conducting dozens of investigations and presenting 
them for prosecution. In response, the Afghan Attorney General’s Office was supporting 
the organized crime and kidnapping investigations but stonewalling any further high-
level corruption cases and even dropping charges on several high-profile cases previously 
investigated.113 Attorney General (AG) Aloko originally told the media that he was 
acting at the direction of President Karzai, but both men later denied Karzai’s association 
with the abandoned charges. 
Unsure of Karzai’s commitment to fighting corruption and unwilling to back 
down on the issue, U.S. officials in Kabul began looking for a test case squarely within 
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his inner circle to assess his willingness to cooperate.114 They found such a subject in 
Mohammad Zai Salehi, Karzai’s head of the Afghan National Security Council. SIU 
investigators had recorded Salehi soliciting a bribe from another high-profile corruption 
subject, Muhammad Rafi Azimi. Investigation into Salehi discovered that he had asked 
Azimi to provide a car for Salehi’s son in exchange for help in getting the charges against 
Azimi dropped.115 
U.S. officials in Kabul and Washington, including U.S. AG Eric Holder, put 
overwhelming pressure on AG Aloko to sign the arrest warrant generated by the SIU 
case,116 and Aloko did so.117 Afghan members of the SIU (although the media reported 
that they were MCTF-A officers) arrested Salehi on July 25, 2010, after a prolonged 
standoff with Salehi and a firefight between the officers sent to arrest him and other MOI 
officers whom he summoned to protect him.118 Allowed to make a phone call from his 
detention cell, Salehi called President Karzai, and within six hours of his arrest, Salehi 
was released.119 Eventually, the charges would be dropped and the Salehi arrest, although 
not carried out by the MCTF-A, would put the MCTF-A in the middle of a political test 
of wills between the U.S. and Afghan governments. 
1. Analysis: Prior to the Salehi Arrest-Functioning As Designed 
The experience of the FBI designing, creating, and operating the MCTF-A prior 
to the Salehi arrest by SIU officers was marked by mainly legal problems. While the 
cultural issues discussed previously did continue to fester and create challenges, the 
MCTF-A was able to either overcome or ignore these issues. However, the most daunting 
issues facing the MCTF-A during its successful rise were legal or justice system based. 
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Two of the primary legal or justice issues detrimental to the successful operation of the 
MCTF-A prior to the Salehi arrest are discussed in the following sections . 
a. A Three-Part Problem 
The Afghan state-run justice system, like that of the United States and many other 
Western nations, is comprised of three separate and distinct entities: investigative, 
prosecutorial, and judicial.120 For the ROL to function properly and equitably within a 
society, all three parts must function properly and be free from corruption and political 
influence. In 2012, the year in which the FBI removed its mentors from the MCTF-A, 
Afghans are believed to have paid approximately $3.9 billion in bribes to public 
officials.121 The top three groups of recipients, in order, were the police, judges, and 
prosecutors.122 In terms of the size of the average bribe, judges and prosecutors were the 
top two groups.123 
The United States and international partners tried a variety of methods to address 
the corruption issue within Afghanistan’s ROL components and to address the education 
and training deficiencies of all three sectors.124 However, their efforts were lacking for 
two broad reasons: the efforts and funding devoted to improving ROL issues started too 
late, and an uneven application of effort to assist the three sectors. 
The United States provided funds to build ROL capacity-building programs 
through both civilian and military mechanisms. Often, programs to assist local police or 
build justice-sector programs have been sponsored in the same regions by both the DoS 
(with INL or the U.S. Agency for International Development usually doing the 
administrative work) and U.S. military units through its provincial reconstruction teams 
(PRTs), District Support Teams, or funds made available to military commanders to 
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support ROL efforts in their area of operation.125 The total amount spent by both DOD 
and the DoS to fund ROL capacity-building programs is unknown due to an inability to 
track DOD funding of such training accurately.126 However, civilian funding of ROL 
assistance grew from $7 million in 2002 to $411 million in 2010, with a total expenditure 
of $904 million through 2010.127 
The recognition by both the Bush and Obama administration that ROL programs 
were critical to the development of a legitimate government within Afghanistan came 
years after the initial invasion in October 2001. Also, the initial U.S. and NATO strategy 
of “keeping the warlords happy,”128 and allowing these warlords and the Karzai 
administration to use staffing of police and justice-sector positions as a means of building 
their patronage network only ensured that, by the time that ROL funding did begin to 
pour into Afghanistan, the persons in positions of power were more interested in bettering 
their own financial situation than in improving ROL capacity and serving the people. 
This type of official graft was not a new phenomenon in Afghanistan; on the contrary, it 
is estimated that between 85 and 90 percent of Soviet aid given following the Soviet 
invasion of this country was lost to similar corruption.129 
Second, U.S. efforts to improve Afghan ROL were focused mainly on the 
investigative sector of the three-part system. As evidenced by the creation of numerous 
police and anti-corruption task forces such as the MCTF-A, SIU, and DOD-led programs 
including CJIATF-435, TF 2010, and Shafafiyet, the prevailing emphasis among U.S. 
officials looking to create an atmosphere of governmental accountability and improve 
ROL was to improve the capacity of investigatory agencies.130  
The DOJ and INL did partner on the Judicial Sector Support Program (JSSP), 
created to provide training and mentoring to prosecutors, defense attorneys, the AG’s 
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Office, and the Ministry of Justice, which handles the Afghan prison system. Along with 
training the larger pool of Afghan prosecutors through the JSSP, the DOJ also provided 
eight attorneys from its agency as part of the senior federal prosecutors program, which 
was dedicated to specialized training for prosecutors working with the SIU and MCTF-A. 
The JSSP did provide training to Afghan judges, but the thrust of U.S. involvement with 
Afghan judges was in the form of providing judicial security through the U.S. Marshals 
Service (USMS). This lack of engagement and training of the judiciary meant that the 
ultimate arbiter of Afghan justice was left completely without mentoring or training on 
how to adapt to the new changes enacted throughout the entire Afghan justice system. 
Also, a lack of engagement left these judges to work outside the anti-corruption reforms 
being enacted in the other two parts of the Afghan justice sector. Training and mentorship 
was fundamentally skewed to the lowest rung of the justice ladder and the group least 
able to ensure anti-corruption cases were brought to a successful conclusion, the police. 
No available data exists to document the funding discrepancy between 
investigative, prosecution, and judicial capacity-building efforts but the number of 
programs devoted to improving investigative capacity, compared to those in the other two 
areas, was sizable.131 This overwhelming push for building investigative capacity and 
capability was likely rooted in the dedication of both Generals McChrystal and Petraeus 
to attack the governmental corruption believed to be fueling the insurgency and the IED 
networks targeting U.S. soldiers every day.132 The reasoning of senior U.S. policymakers 
in 2009 was that criminality, by corrupt officials, regional powerbrokers, and the Taliban, 
was funding the insurgency, and that therefore, law enforcement, specifically policing, 
was better suited than military means to counter the problem.133 Law enforcement came 
to be viewed as another weapon to be leveled against the malign actors supporting the 
insurgency. The hope was this law enforcement weapon would be usable by military 
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commanders unable, due to either political or other considerations, or unwilling to target 
these actors with lethal force.134 
As a whole, much of the police capacity building succeeded.135 As evidenced by 
the large number of cases built by the MCTF-A and the high-profile arrests of several 
senior Karzai administration officials, the FBI and their international partners were very 
successful in training capable MOI and NDS investigators.136 However, despite the 
hundreds of cases built, and the mountains of solid evidence compiled by these 
investigative agencies, not a single MCTF-A corruption case involving a senior Karzai 
administration official was ever successfully prosecuted.137 
The uneven efforts to build ROL capacity led to the worst possible outcome for 
long-term ROL reform, in that investigators saw their efforts to build corruption cases as 
futile. They were unable to gain convictions as prosecutors and judges were empowered 
to dismiss or disregard these corruption cases with impunity. To add insult to injury for 
the investigative agencies, many MOI and NDS officials and investigators assigned to the 
MCTF-A later met with reprisals or retaliation from the powerful figures that they had 
originally investigated.138  
b. Legal Authorities and Laws 
One of the frequently cited reasons for the eventual dismissal of charges against 
Salehi and of other corruption cases was that Afghan law did not permit evidence 
collected by wiretaps to be used in corruption cases.139 As stated by representatives from 
the AG’s Office, Afghan law authorizes the use of wiretapping evidence only in crimes 
involving narco-trafficking or money laundering. While the AG’s office originally signed 
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the legal documents authorizing the tapping of the calls on which Salehi is reported to 
have solicited a bribe, it later indicated that such evidence is not legal or admissible. 
The DEA-led SIU originally set up the wiretapping network for use in SIU’s 
counter-narcotics investigations. As in the United States, the laundering of drug proceeds 
is a key part of the drug trade. Thus, targeting the illegal movement of these funds is a 
key aspect of attacking drug cartels and enterprises.  
Establishing the legal authority to use advanced investigative techniques, such as 
wiretapping, was a key part of building Afghan investigative capability and capacity.140 
U.S. law enforcement officers who established and mentored SIU investigators ensured 
that the legal authority was in place to use the most useful techniques and then applied 
these techniques to build a successful counter-drug campaign and successfully target 
Afghan drug networks. The MCTF-A did not seek separate legal wiretapping authority 
for corruption cases. It is not clear if the task force’s failure to obtain additional 
wiretapping authority was due to ignorance of the need for such authority or a belief that 
existing laws provided sufficient authorization, or if perhaps, additional authority was 
indeed requested from the Karzai administration but without success. Whatever the 
reason, clear legal authority to use wiretap evidence in MCTF-A corruption 
investigations was never granted explicitly; thereby, all the corruption cases built upon 
this type of intercepted evidence were undermined. 
Additionally, legislation specifically authorizing the MCTF-A to operate and 
conduct the type of corruption investigations for which senior U.S. leaders were calling 
was continually stalled by the Karzai administration. FBI, the DOS, and DOD officials 
pushed the AG’s office and President Karzai for the type of legal authority that can be 
granted only through legislation but the needed laws were never approved. Legislation 
authorizing the MCTF-A, had it been passed, may have helped the task force to maintain 
greater independence by creating a separation of powers from President Karzai.141 
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However, ample evidence is available that President Karzai was willing to ignore the 
separation of powers required for a truly independent, state-run justice system. 
C. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE MCTF-A FOLLOWING THE SALEHI 
ARREST 
President Karzai’s response to the Salehi arrest was swift and public and (even 
though the MCTF-A was not directly responsible for either the Salehi investigation or the 
arrest) aimed squarely at the MCTF-A. President Karzai claimed, contrary to what U.S. 
officials said, that the MCTF-A was “essentially run by the foreigners.”142 Even though it 
was not responsible for this particular case, the MCTF-A had established itself as the 
preeminent task force for attacking governmental corruption; therefore, it was in the 
crosshairs of the entire Karzai administration. One Afghan official would explain later 
how Karzai’s administration viewed the task force: “Our assessments show that MCTF 
purports to be an Afghan institution but it is run by others.”143 Whereas, in previous 
clashes, Karzai had tried to deflect responsibility for derailing investigations or 
prosecutions of friends and political allies, this time he affirmed that he had acted to 
release Salehi,144 even boasting in a U.S. television interview that “I intervened very, 
very strongly.”145 Moreover, he immediately ordered a commission to investigate both 
the MCTF-A and the SIU, and he directed AG Aloko to suspend the “top up” payments 
used to augment the salaries of MCTF-A investigators to attract the most qualified 
personnel and combat the risk of corruption within the task force itself. All these actions 
led the White House to respond in firm support of the MCTF-A and its anti-corruption 
initiatives.146 A White House spokesman stated, “We are concerned about any attempt 
which could undermine the independence and authorities of Afghanistan’s nascent anti-
corruption bodies such as the Major Crimes Task Force.”147 
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The public rift over the investigative independence of the MCTF-A caused by the 
Salehi arrest led to another round of meetings between Karzai and numerous senior U.S. 
officials from Kabul and Washington. Although Karzai was reported to have promised 
U.S. officials that the MCTF-A would retain its ability to operate without direct 
oversight,148 on August 4, AG Aloko held a press conference to declare that his office 
would be taking control of the MCTF-A and SIU’s operations and would examine each 
MCTF-A case as to its merits.149 Direct communications from Secretary Clinton and 
Senator Kerry to President Karzai seemed to pull Karzai back from his most stringent 
positions and led him to withdraw some of the earlier sanctions.150 
However, Karzai’s increasing volatility in dealing with the corruption issue, 
which was spilling over and poisoning other important aspects of the U.S.-Afghan 
relationship, drove U.S. policymakers in Washington and Kabul to hold a series of 
emergency meetings in late summer 2010 to reassess their anti-corruption strategy and 
their support for the MCTF-A.151 The debate broke down into two main points of view. 
Some top U.S. officials viewed tackling Afghan corruption and establishing the Afghan 
government’s legitimacy as a fundamental requirement for mission success in 
Afghanistan.152 This requirement was a key tenet of the counterinsurgency doctrines of 
both Generals McChrystal and Petraeus. The opposing view held that pursuing good 
governance constituted mission creep for the main CT effort.153 This argument rested on 
the assumption that accomplishing the overarching CT objectives in Afghanistan often 
called for working with the type of individuals whom the military often placed within its 
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“malign actors” category and frequently targeted for detention.154 This side also argued 
that attacking corruption would weaken Karzai to the point of ineffectiveness due to his 
inability to curry favor with the local warlords and powerbrokers on whose influence and 
power outside the Afghan capital he depended. Opponents of aggressively targeting 
corruption also posed a dilemma. While Karzai may not be an ideal partner for U.S. 
efforts in Afghanistan, did the United States have the patience or will to start over with a 
new partner?155 
As this debate continued to play out in Washington and Kabul, Karzai continued 
to press the issue. On August 25 and 26, two prosecutors within the AG’s office who 
were known to facilitate MCTF-A corruption investigations and aggressively prosecute 
the resulting charges were fired, although an official statement indicated that both were 
forced to retire. Both prosecutors, Deputy Attorney General Fazul Ahmed Faqiryar, and 
Amrodin Wafa, did not fall into the Karzai-Aloko camp and had openly defied the two 
top leaders by releasing the names of 25 senior Karzai officials currently under 
investigation for corruption.156  
While U.S. officials continued their internal debate over U.S. anti-corruption 
strategy, the MCTF-A’s kidnapping and organized crime units continued to build 
cases.157 However, although MCTF-A officers continued to open and actively investigate 
corruption-related cases, no further arrests were approved and no individuals previously 
arrested were prosecuted. While AG Aloko insisted that the MCTF-A was operating 
normally, he did confirm in a late-summer interview that no arrests had been made and 
no further prosecutions were underway. 
The issue came to a head on September 13, 2010 when President Obama called an 
emergency meeting at the White House to discuss the U.S. anti-corruption policy in 
Kabul. The main question was whether the U.S. could address corruption and still 
154 Warren Stroebel and Marisa Taylor, “U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption 
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maintain the relationship with Karzai required to execute its mission in Afghanistan. 
Following the White House meeting, Obama directed the CIA, DOD, DoS, and DOJ to 
develop guidelines for addressing corruption by functionaries and bureaucrats at the local 
and provincial levels but to stay away from investigating high-level officials and Karzai 
allies, the exact type of case the MCTF-A was created to pursue.158 
Although no official policy detailing the U.S. retreat on corruption matters was 
produced until January 2011, and then only in classified documents,159 U.S. officials in 
Kabul slowly began to see the writing on the wall and previously fervent supporters, such 
as General Petraeus, slowly backed away from the anti-corruption strategy and the 
MCTF-A.160 The only group that did not understand or follow the new “bottom-up” 
approach to tackling Afghan corruption was the MCTF-A. The Afghan investigators and 
their international mentors continued to build cases, only to have them disappear when 
they reached the AG’s office.161 In contrast to previous incidents, now no high-ranking 
U.S. diplomat or political leader was calling over to the AG’s office to demand 
information on the status of the investigations. 
As New York Times reporter, Mark Mazzetti, wrote when relaying the thoughts of 
senior White House officials regarding the strategy change, “Will victory in Afghanistan 
be closer with each aide to Karzai who is hauled off to jail?”162 Many observers viewed 
the new corruption policy that effectively killed the MCTF-A as coming down to one 
question, whether it was in the U.S. interest to aggressively pursue its national security 
agenda through all means possible, even if that meant partnering with many of the 
“malign actors” who controlled most of Afghanistan, or to push for a western-ideal of 
good governance from the Karzai administration in hopes of eventually creating a lasting 
and legitimate Afghan democracy. 
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While the MCTF-A still operated successfully in its other two assigned areas, 
organized crime and kidnapping investigations,163 the FBI and other international law 
enforcement partners began withdrawing personnel from the task force in early 2012. By 
the end of that year, only a couple international mentors remained. Within two years of 
the MCTF-A’s establishment, and the arrival of the first full-time FBI personnel, all FBI 
staff had left Camp Falcon.164 
Following the FBI’s withdrawal, the MOI and NDS, and the original Afghan 
commander of the MCTF-A, also withdrew most Afghan investigators, was relocated to 
the United States to avoid political reprisals for his work at the task force. The remaining, 
much smaller MCTF-A signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to partner with 
the ISAF’s Combined Joint Interagency Task Force–Afghanistan in August 2013.165 The 
purpose of the MOU is to use the information developed through the MCTF-A’s criminal 
investigations to feed the ISAF’s military efforts. This strategy of using law enforcement 
investigations to bolster military targeting of so-called “malign actors” had previously 
been dismissed by law enforcement mentors, since the stated purpose of the MCTF-A 
was to fight corruption and the insurgency through rule of law channels not military 
action. The MCTF-A still operates with support of DOD finances and personnel but the 
mandate to attack corruption actively, or the international law enforcement (LE) expertise 
needed to mentor the Afghans still assigned there are both gone.  
1. Analysis: After Salehi, The Decline of the MCTF-A and the FBI’s 
Withdrawal 
As stated earlier, the arrest and subsequent release of Mohammad Zai Salehi, and 
the very public response from President Karzai, moved the challenges and problems 
faced from by the FBI and the MCTF-A from the cultural and legal realm into the much 
more dangerous political realm. Since the fight over the U.S.’s insistence on it campaign 
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to hold Afghan political officials “accountable” and attack the corruption, many U.S. 
leaders in Kabul and Washington believed was fueling the insurgency became so public 
and well documented within the media, no alternative existed other than to make the 
issue a political test of wills. While political will did play an important part in the closing 
act of the FBI’s close association with the MCTF-A, the political camps were not as 
neatly defined as the coalition against their Afghan patrons. 
a. Political Will 
It would be easy to say that the FBI was in above its head in attempting to create a 
task force from scratch in a fourth world country, one that the DoS and DOD were 
counting on to play a key part in introducing an atmosphere of accountability that has 
been missing from the Afghan government for decades. As shown earlier, the MCTF-A 
quickly became seen as a panacea for battling both governmental graft and stopping the 
international aid flooding into Afghanistan from being siphoned off and feeding the 
insurgency.166 The most senior Obama administration officials cited the MCTF-A by 
name when asked what the United States was doing to hold President Karzai and his 
cronies accountable for corruption within the Afghan government.  
Once it became obvious that Karzai would not be a willing partner in targeting the 
CPNs on which he and his allies relied for political survival, many within the U.S. 
government, the international community, and the media said that the matter of helping 
the MCTF-A conduct its anti-corruption mission was simply a matter of political will.167 
Did the U.S. government, specifically the White House, have the will to make Karzai 
bend to its wishes? Was the United States truly committed to making members of the 
Afghan government act in a way that demonstrated concern for the well being of Afghan 
citizens rather than just using their power to improve their personal and financial 
circumstances? Many analyses of the U.S. government’s efforts to target government 
166 “Major Crimes Task Force: A Key Element of the Road Map.” 
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corruption by using programs like the MCTF-A to build investigative capacity claim that 
U.S. policymakers simply folded once the stakes got too high.168 
Many examples of U.S. leaders paying lip service to strengthening anti-corruption 
efforts are available, but then backing away from programs capable of controlling 
graft.169 The MCTF-A was roundly praised for its efforts to target corrupt Karzai 
officials, until it succeeded. Was the FBI in over its head, or did the White House simply 
lack the will or fortitude to carry through on the statements from both President Obama 
and Congress about withholding U.S. funding if Karzai did not clean up his 
administration? 
Lack of political will alone does not explain the debacle. However, U.S. 
policymakers began with a serious misunderstanding of the historical, current, and 
fundamental realities of the Afghan political system, which resulted in their inability to 
coalesce around one cogent strategy for advancing U.S. interests in Afghanistan.170  
As John Hooker explained in A Cross-Cultural View of Corruption, “[C]orruption 
is best understood as behavior that corrupts: it undermines the cultural system in which it 
occurs.”171 This explanation underscores the need to understand the Afghan cultural 
system. Like many others in the region, Afghan culture is based on ethnic ties and 
personal relationships, unlike most Western cultures that are generally based on laws and 
rules. As a result, authority and trust are accumulated and leveraged by individuals rather 
than lodged in rule-based systems in which the person’s position conveys power.172 In 
the West, people rely on the trustworthiness of government and legal systems, whereas in 
many more ancient and poorer cultures, such as Afghanistan, people trust only friends 
and other persons with whom they have an established relationship or familiar 
connection.173 Simply put, government leaders are powerful in Afghanistan not because 
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of the position that they hold, but by building networks of trusted partners. This 
relationship is often described as similar to the patron-client relationship seen in U.S. 
crime syndicates or the Italian Mafia, a concept well understood by the FBI. 
The use of behaviors defined by rule-based cultures as corrupting, such as 
nepotism, cronyism, graft, and bribery, is at the heart of the conflict between the United 
States and President Karzai. As documented above, the United States frequently and 
publicly called on Karzai to clean up his government. This U.S. posture placed Karzai in 
a doubly precarious situation. He would be seen as bowing to the U.S. demands if he 
allowed his patrons to be targeted, and he would deliberately be permitting the shrinking 
of his patron base, and thus ultimately, of his own power. Applying the earlier 
observation about the source of power in traditional Afghan society, even President 
Karzai is not powerful because he is the president, but because he has significant control 
of the international aid and funding that he can use to fuel his network of patrons. When 
the situation is viewed from this perspective, in a sense, the United States was asking 
Karzai to commit what he may have viewed as political suicide and to act in a way that, 
while adding to his government’s legitimacy in the eyes of international observers, ran 
counter to established cultural norms and to ways of ruling that have existed in his region 
of the world for centuries.174 
At some point during the public wrangling over the corruption issue between 
2009 and 2011, U.S. policymakers may have come to understand that forcing Karzai to 
act in a way that actually weakened his position within the country would be 
counterproductive to the current U.S. strategy. At that point, the White House may have 
been unwilling to risk losing Karzai and having to start over with a new leader. Top U.S. 
policymakers must have asked themselves how putting Karzai allies in jail would 
practically advance the collective U.S. security interest in the country. 
Secondly, revelations after the Salehi arrest exposed the fact that Salehi and 
virtually every significant political player in Afghan politics, including Karzai, were on 
174 Hooker, A Cross-Cultural View of Corruption. 
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the CIA payroll.175 It has been reported that the CIA paid “tens of millions of dollars” 
directly to President Karzai and that similar but smaller payments went to Salehi and 
other close Karzai allies.176 The CIA has not confirmed the payments, but it is widely 
believed that they are in line with similar payments it has made to other foreign leaders to 
purchase influence and curry favor. Following the arrest of Salehi and the eventual public 
disclosure of these direct CIA payments, Karzai himself confirmed the payments and 
indicated that the CIA station chief in Kabul had assured him that the payments would 
continue despite outcries from U.S. political leaders and public criticism.177 
This financial relationship between the CIA and Karzai demonstrates both the 
U.S. government’s inability to control all its own players in the Afghan conflict and a 
glaring instance of hypocrisy. U.S. leaders were publicly declaring that Karzai must stop 
the extra-governmental payments to his cronies that were designed to buy influence and 
expand his power base, while at the same time, the United States was secretly paying 
Karzai as part of an effort to buy influence and increase its power base! Again, whether 
the decision to back away from continuing to push Karzai to “clean up” his government 
was based on lack of political will to continue to empower forces like the MCTF-A is tied 
to the CIA payments is unknown. Perhaps U.S. advisors and policymakers simply 
became convinced that allowing Karzai to continue to build his power through his CPNs 
and then tapping into his increased power was more advantageous to U.S. national 
interests in Afghanistan than promoting a legitimate democracy but a weaker Karzai.  
It is not clear if the 2010 decision to change the White House-sponsored anti-
corruption campaign was due to one hand within the government not knowing what the 
other was doing, or if a fundamental disagreement was occurring over how best to 
advance the U.S.’s overarching but short-term national security interests in Afghanistan. 
In either case, much effort, millions of dollars, untold personnel resources, and many 
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U.S.-Afghan relationships were expended on efforts not only out of sync but often 
counterproductive.  
D. SUMMARY 
The MCTF-A was the first time the FBI attempted to field an industrial-sized rule 
ROL capacity-building program, and the first time that the FBI found itself between, not 
only, other U.S. agencies’ strategic in a country but also between that country’s and the 
U.S. presidents. Simply saying the FBI should never take on large-scale capacity-building 
programs or partner with foreign LE agencies to attempt to tackle tough criminal and 
terrorism-related matter would be short-sided and counterproductive to the strategic 
interests of the United States in many countries in which terrorist groups are now trying 
to establish a safe haven. The overarching lesson the FBI should take from this 
experience should not be never to take on difficult or large justice sector capacity-
building programs again, but that a criteria must be created to independently evaluate 
each proposed program. 
 46 
III. MOVING TO THE NEXT CHALLENGE 
As the case study of the MCTF-A demonstrates, efforts to build ROL capacity 
and capabilities in a host nation (HN) without the necessary reflection on the viability of 
the endeavor, a realistic expectation of what is attainable, and an ROL strategy that fits 
with the U.S.’s strategic goals, are doomed to be marginally successful at best and 
counterproductive at worst. However, neither can the United States simply walk away 
from the business of building indigenous ROL capacity, because of the threats posed by 
Jihadist terrorist groups operating in countries that cannot maintain adequate security due 
to substandard policing or justice system components. Additionally, the current U.S. 
national CT strategy places great emphasis on development of competent CT partnerships 
with countries throughout the Middle East and Africa.178 To build these capable law 
enforcement and intelligence partners, development of a competent and robust LE 
architecture is essential. 
A. DEFINING RULE OF LAW PRINCIPLES TO BE ACHIEVED OR 
STRENGTHENED 
Terrorist groups seeking long-term sustainability must gain popular acceptance of 
the group and its aims from the population in the area in which they seek to operate or 
conceal themselves. One common way to build this acceptance of an “us versus them” 
mentality, which Taliban and other insurgent groups in Afghanistan did very well, is to 
create strong in-group (ethnic Afghan, Muslim, etc.) and out-group dynamics (foreign, 
non-Muslim, etc.).179 Terrorists frequently highlight the supposed injustices perpetrated 
against their in-group by the larger out-group. Allowing perceived or real injustices to 
fester or grow within a country in which terrorist groups are actively attempting to tear 
down the government’s legitimacy not only threatens the government’s survival but also 
can have degrading effects on regional security. Along with the example of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan appealing to local Afghans to rise up against the international forces they 
178 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 
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deemed as the out-group, the same type of message is commonly used by al Shabaab 
leaders during the deterioration of Somalia, and by current Islamic State fighters in Iraq 
and Syria. 
U.S. and international officials attempting to counter this message and the Afghan 
insurgency knew that ROL principles, even if not constructed along the lines of the 
typical Western model, are critical not only for combating current terrorist threats but 
also for creating a societal framework resistant to the type of messages on which 
terrorists rely to create areas of safe haven. The emphasis on any ROL capacity building, 
whether small, focused skills-based training or industrial sized programs, such as the 
MCTF-A, should not be to import wholesale changes to an HN’s justice system or to 
create a Westernized model in an area in which the rules-based approach is not culturally 
appropriate, or politically or socially viable. All ROL programs should be ends-based and 
not focused on a one-size-fits all approach.180 While the United States and the West 
believed that the “Afghan FBI” would be eagerly accepted and U.S. views on LE reform 
and the justice system had universal applicability, they are not as commonly held within 
personality-based cultures.181 As such, the goals of ROL programs should be principle-
based (what they are trying to accomplish) rather than procedurally based (how the 
ultimate goal is accomplished). Rachel Kleinfeld succinctly states the goals of an ends-
based ROL program as follows:182 
• Law and order 
• Government bound by law 
• Equality before the law 
• Predictable and efficient justice 
• Protection of human rights 
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U.S. and international efforts to build ROL capacity and capabilities, particularly 
in areas with minimal or no history of centrally administered justice systems, should 
focus on how to accomplish the above desired end states rather than on building a system 
that mirrors Western systems.183 
To accomplish the desired end state of strengthening a CT partner’s justice system 
and improving the country’s ROL, it is first essential to determine if such an undertaking 
is advisable and if the likelihood of success is sufficiently high to justify the expected 
time, resources, and effort required. To address these two points requires a strategic 
assessment of the potential recipient country and its current state of justice and ROL. A 
description of the rudimentary framework for conducting this assessment and 
determining the viability and likelihood of success follows. The FBI or other 
international entities seeking to improve or reform the Afghan justice sector did not 
undertake this type of strategic assessment described in the following sections, but the 
international community’s experience with ROL endeavors in Afghanistan indicate an 
assessment should be conducted prior to other large capacity-building programs. While 
conducting such an assessment is not a guarantee of success for building LE capabilities 
or enacting ROL reforms, the case of the MCTF-A demonstrates the downside of not 
taking any steps to assess the political, legal or social frameworks fully prior to 
undertaking a large-scale endeavor. The amount of data on mid to large-scale justice 
sector capacity building programs is very limited and the experience of the FBI with the 
MCTF-A serves as a potent example of how things can, even with the best intentions and 
efforts, fall short. However, while the unsatisfactory outcome of the MCTF-A and the 
steps taken to arrive at the outcome can serve as a guide of what to avoid in future 
projects, it simply is not possible to guarantee, based on the limited data, that different 
preliminary actions will lead to improved ultimate results. The following assessment is 
based on the political, social, and legal challenges that eventually derailed the MCTF-A, 
and proposes data that, if collected prior to the design or implementation of a ROL 
capacity-building program, can help the FBI avoid re-making prior mistakes. 
183 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
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1. Step 1: Rule-of-Law Capacity-Building Assessment for Strategic CT 
Partners 
To assess the potential of ROL capacity-building programs to take hold, function 
as designed, and make meaningful contributions to a partner nation’s ability to strengthen 
its internal security, a strategic-level, in-depth ROL and justice sector assessment must be 
conducted. Such an assessment must occur before any ROL capacity-building programs 
are planned, designed, or attempted. It must fully examine the country’s history, culture, 
and current political situation along with evaluating justice-sector components. As 
demonstrated by the history of the MCTF-A, a national justice system and ROL 
structures do not operate in a vacuum. Unless an in-depth understanding of the societal, 
cultural, and political forces in play is gained prior to the design of any programs, the 
likelihood of success is greatly diminished. I will review the key areas that must be 
included in any ROL assessment. 
a. History 
Reviewing the country’s history means determining how the country, its justice 
system, and key leaders within the government reached the level at which they are today. 
The competence, capacities, and capabilities of all concerned parties will be assessed at a 
later time, but an detailed understanding of the internal and external forces that have led 
the country to its current ROL status is critical to understanding where, how, or even 
whether to begin any ROL programs.  
An examination of the recent history of Afghanistan leading up to the U.S. 
invasion would have found the entire country of Afghanistan, including its justice system, 
had been decimated by decades of war. The Soviet invasion, the Afghan civil war, and 
constant squabbling among regional warlords and powerbrokers had left Afghanistan 
with no functioning central government. The Taliban-led government had tight control on 
some areas of the country and no control at all in others. The United States and its 
international partners could call on no existing government infrastructure to begin 
rebuilding an Afghan justice system and ROL.184  
184 Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” 319–41. 
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Additionally, over the past generation the Afghan government, particularly during 
the Soviet occupation, had used the justice system as a means to control the population, 
not as a way to protect its citizens. The criminal justice system functioned largely as a 
political tool for those in power, as “rule by law” rather than rule of law.185 This 
approach was particularly evident in the Taliban’s creation of the Ministry for the 
Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in 1992.186 Taliban officials used the 
Virtue Ministry as a way of forcing the Afghan population to accept the Taliban’s strict 
form of Islam and to submit to their authority.  
In view of both the lack of sufficient ROL partners and the fact that what little 
justice procedures were in place at the time of the U.S. invasion were being used to 
enforce the Taliban’s version of strict Islamic law, an ROL assessment would have 
indicated that the United States faced a double Herculean task, (1) building a functioning 
justice system essentially from the ground up, and (2) building trust in the state system 
among the Afghan people.  
Additionally, the assessment should capture the most recent history and ongoing 
events. The MCTF-A was formed in an attempt to counter a corrupt political system that 
was believed to be a primary income source for the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent 
groups. An examination of Afghan history and culture would have made evident that 
corruption was a deeply ingrained part of Afghan politics and government but the recent 
examination would have also shown that this task was going to be even more 
insurmountable based on the tens of billions of dollars in U.S. and international aid that 
had already and was continuing to flow into the impoverished Afghan economy.  
Every potential CT partner country has its own unique history that impacts its 
current functioning. Unless that history is fully understood, efforts to build physical 
infrastructure, train personnel, or achieve public support will likely underperform or be 
completely undermined. While the FBI and many LE partners were acting with admirable 
and honest intentions attempting to build a functional Afghan justice system, their efforts 
185 Soli J. Sorabee, “Rule of Law Should Not Be Confused With Rule by Law,” New Indian Express, 
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would always bear the shadow of former Afghan governments that used the justice and 
legal system for their own selfish agendas. 
b. Culture 
Every nation has one or more culturally accepted methods of handling dispute 
resolution. As discussed previously, the U.S. and Western nations are rules-based 
cultures whose citizens have accepted that a government-administered justice system is 
the most advantageous way to maintain a robust rule of law that protects the rights of 
citizens. However, many poorer, less developed, or religious-centric cultures are less 
willing to accept the notion that a central government run by people with whom they 
have no personal experience is best able to protect their rights or adequately represent 
their concept of justice. Again, Afghanistan and the attempts to create a legitimate state-
run justice system is a good example for examination.  
Throughout modern history, Afghan culture has rarely if ever had a formal, 
central government-administered justice system, and certainly, Afghanistan has not had 
one since the Soviet invasion of December 1979.187 While the constant conflict in 
Afghanistan has made creating or running such a system nearly impossible, the greater 
impediment, as discussed earlier, is Afghan culture’s reliance on community-based 
justice solutions, such as jirgas or tribal councils.188 As a result of this cultural 
preference, previous Afghan central or provincial governments placed little emphasis on 
building or strengthening justice institutions. As a personality-based culture, Afghanistan 
relied heavily on relations within tribes and well-respected elders to be the ultimate 
justice authority or source of dispute resolution.189 
When the U.S. invasion began, Afghan views on justice and the rule of law were 
predominantly the same as when the Soviets had invaded a generation earlier, or when 
the British had invaded a century and a half ago. Therefore, the window of opportunity to 
build a Western-style justice system that would be largely accepted by the majority of 




                                                 
average Afghans was never truly open. However, the U.S.-led coalition could have 
sought to support the culturally accepted alternative justice system and ensure its 
continued functioning. Instead, the coalition began to build or rebuild Kabul-based 
Western-style police and justice institutions that had little or no influence on the vast 
majority of the mainly rural Afghan population. The coalition also attempted to replace 
the traditional alternative justice solutions with more formal, Western systems in the 
provinces, where such institutions had never functioned before. By de-emphasizing the 
traditional and culturally accepted justice solutions and attempting to replace them in the 
mainly rural Afghanistan with formal institutions that had no cultural acceptance, the 
coalition left an opening for the Taliban to create its own culturally accepted court system 
for dispute resolution.190  
The United States and the West view justice and the rule of law as a universal 
standard,191 which requires well-trained and respected police agencies, honest 
prosecutors, and a fair and educated judiciary. However, most cultures and societies 
around the world do not adhere to such a strict rules-based approach. An assessment of 
the culturally accepted norms for dispute resolution and administering justice must occur 
before the United States proposes any large-scale ROL endeavors. Creating or rebuilding 
a Western-style justice system or focusing exclusively on recreating HN “FBIs” when the 
HN population has never been exposed to centrally administered ROL will undoubtedly 
be unproductive, and possibly, as in Afghanistan, could actually be counterproductive to 
U.S. long-term strategic interests. 
c. Legitimacy of Government 
The purpose of an insurgency, such as the Taliban in its present opposition status 
or the many Jihadist terrorist groups now posing threats to the United States, is to tear 
down the legitimacy of the government in the country in which they are operating or are 
targeting for attacks.192 Many governments, while battling terrorist threats or 
190 Giustozzi, Franco, and Baczko, Shadow Justice: How the Taliban Run Their Judiciary, 33. 
191 Hooker, A Cross-Cultural View of Corruption. 
192 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering 
Insurgencies (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, version dated June 2, 2014).  
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insurgencies, unconsciously help the very groups they are fighting by carrying out actions 
that undermine their legitimacy and credibility with their citizens, who are the people 
most needed to defeat the opposing terrorist group.193  
The Afghan central government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 76 percent of 
Afghans who live in rural areas, and the over 90 percent not living in Kabul,194 was low 
when the international coalition partners installed this government and has only 
continued to drop.195 When the United States attempted to prop up this legitimacy, its 
very strategy aimed at building stability in the country by empowering regional warlords 
actually served to undermine the Kabul-based government further.196  
Similarly, many countries affected by the Arab Spring are facing the challenge of 
creating a government that can sustain any popular legitimacy among its citizens. Old 
regimes are kicked out because of their repressive policies or their failure to represent 
citizen concerns, but the incoming political leaders often adhere to similar policies and 
practices, although possibly for different purposes, as the ousted government. Unless a 
country has a history of representative and responsive government, or at a minimum, 
leaders who enjoy some popular support for their policies and governance, the foundation 
for ROL is not present.197  
Afghan leaders and the Afghan central government had neither a history of 
legitimacy nor a popular mandate to rule. It was impossible for the United States to help 
the Afghan government overcome its history of lack of governmental legitimacy. 
Additionally, the MCTF-A was designed to tear down the traditional mechanism within 
Afghan society to build a popular coalition. 
Sufficient data is not available in the MCTF-A case study or on similar capacity-
building endeavors to evaluate fully what benchmarks could be created to assess a HN 
193 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
194 Wikipedia, s.v. “Afghan Demographics,” accessed September 8, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Demographics_of_Afghanistan,. 
195 Cordesman, Legitimacy and the Afghan Elections. 
196 Cappacio, “Afghanistan Corruption Fostered by U.S.” 
197 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
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government’s level of legitimacy completely. However, it can be evidenced that a 
government struggling to solidify its power and legitimacy in the eyes of its public cannot 
be expected to enact reforms that would have detrimental short-term effects on its hold on 
power.198 A complete examination of where a country stands in its fight to gain 
legitimacy is essential to understanding the soil with which FBI or other ROL capacity 
builders have to plant any seeds of law enforcement or justice system reforms.  
d. The Justice System 
As evidenced by the frustration of U.S. and Afghan officials in attempting to 
prosecute corruption cases that intransigent prosecutors would not take to court or corrupt 
judges dismissed on dubious legal merits, an entire justice system must be functional to 
be effective. Along with determining the culturally accepted model for justice in HNs in 
which the United States would like to strengthen ROL capabilities and expand capacity, a 
thorough examination of existing justice institutions must also occur. The following 
sections discuss several of the most critical elements of this evaluation. 
(1) Old vs. New.  
Many post-conflict nations and countries that currently have terrorist groups 
operating or training within their borders have recently undergone political and 
governmental upheavals. The same as the U.S.-led invasion wiped away the Taliban-led 
government in Kabul, the Arab Spring has swept out many old regimes or completely 
rearranged the political landscape. In response to citizen demand, countries, such as 
Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, have enacted significant reforms or changes in their justice 
system. Although these reforms, which often call for more openness and transparency 
and strengthening ROL, may be viewed positively by Western powers, the reforms often 
take time to be completely solidified within the government.  
In areas in which the justice system was formerly used more for rule by law rather 
than rule of law, even former opposition leaders may not be willing to let go of 
previously accepted ways to manage dissent or control political rivals. Determining 
198 The White House, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group Report on U.S. Policy Towards 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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whether political and justice reforms are actually taking hold is essential to assessing the 
ability or willingness of new leaders to enact or enforce ROL changes or expand 
capacity. 
(2) Status of All Three Sectors.  
As discussed previously, police reforms and training are overrepresented, and 
often garner the majority of effort in U.S. and internationally sponsored post-conflict and 
peacetime ROL capacity-building programs.199 However, as vividly demonstrated by the 
MCTF-A experience, all three pillars of a justice system must be equally competent and 
capable for the system to function. When global powers seek to build ROL capacity in 
post-conflict societies, “If reformed police forces arrest criminal subjects only to have 
them released by corrupt and intimidated judges, for instance, or if subjects languish in 
squalid prisons for months or years without access to judicial process, the entire law 
enforcement system is undermined.”200 
Police need both the skills and capabilities required to address the types of 
criminal activity present within their areas and the capacity to meet the demand. 
Prosecutors must thoroughly know the law and must be skilled in building competent 
cases and gaining convictions in their court system. Lastly, judges must be educated, fair, 
and able to render verdicts in line with the culturally accepted norms of punishment. 
Additionally, and possibly most important, all three sectors must function free from 
corruption or intimidation. Understanding the current state of the three sectors and their 
strength relative to each other is vital to assessing the viability of growing the HN’s ROL 
system. 
(3) Societal–Justice System  
Relations.201 How do the police and justice officials view their role in society? Do 
police, prosecutors, and judges view their role as one of protecting citizens from those 
who wish to do them some type of harm, or as instruments of the government or political 
199 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
200 Ibid., 218. 
201 Ibid. 
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leaders to control the population? The answer is likely be somewhere in the middle, but 
understanding how police view their role in society is instrumental to determining the 
type of training and capabilities that should be provided, if any. Technology and 
capabilities provided by Western countries under the auspices of CT capacity building 
can easily be used to target opposition parties or in other ways not supportive of 
comprehensive CT strategies in the region. In brief, due diligence with regard to how all 
justice sectors view themselves and how these three pillars have functioned in the past 
must be conducted before a decision is made on providing any additional capacity or 
advanced policing capabilities. 
(4) Political Involvement.  
How do the political leaders of the HN view ROL? Peaceful transitions of power 
are rare in areas in which terrorist groups have the freedom to operate in ungoverned 
spaces. Tyrants, dictators, and even democratically elected officials in these areas, often 
view their political survival as the most pressing matter of national security, and 
therefore, they view police and intelligence services as another tool to achieve that 
aim.202 
A separate and independent judiciary free from political pressure and a police 
force that can conduct investigations without political influence are essential for strong 
ROL representative of the nation’s citizens. However, the United States has maintained 
long and effective CT partnerships with countries that do not meet these conditions. It is 
not the responsibility of those making this assessment to determine if the U.S. 
government is willing to overlook certain uses of police or the justice system by HN 
political leaders; however, planners should collect the information and include it as 
another data point for evaluation. 
(5) Past training.  
Past performance is the best predictor of future performance, behavior, or success. 
Has the United States or have other international partners conducted ROL capacity-
202 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is 
Almost Always Good (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 
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building programs in this country in the past? Following the Bonn Conference in late 
2001, Germany began providing police training to Afghan Ministry of Interior police 
units to establish basic ROL services.203 The German program focused on physical 
improvements and construction of police institutions.204 In the mid- to late 2000s, other 
international partners jumped in to assist, often without invitation and in an 
uncoordinated fashion.205 An examination of the previous training in Afghanistan should 
have been conducted prior to the agreement between the FBI and DOD to create the 
MCTF-A. Whether the training was coordinated or conducted in a manner consistent 
with the overarching strategic goals of the ISAF is not as important to predicting the 
success of future ROL programs as the actual return on investment on these programs, or 
whether the students put the information and training provided to them into use in an 
effective manner. Determining what has or has not worked well in the past, and why, and 
how the knowledge, training, or capabilities did or did not improve justice system 
performance, is critical for anyone designing or implementing an HN ROL training 
program. 
e. Evaluation of the Assessment 
Once this strategic assessment of the potential beneficiary of U.S.-sponsored 
policing or justice-sector capacity-building programs has been completed, the FBI and 
other U.S. government partners must decide if a comprehensive ROL program is 
appropriate, and if it would likely be successful in supporting overarching U.S. strategic 
goals within the country and region. Standardized evaluation criteria should be created, 
and the scoring must occur at the strategic level without undue influence by the tactical 
goals and strategies of those working in the country. The MCTF-A was created to 
confront what senior leaders in Afghanistan considered the most imminent threats to U.S. 
and international efforts to reconstruct the country. However, the MCTF-A, along with 
virtually all the other ROL capacity-building programs run out of Kabul, was out of step 
203 Seth Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Washington, DC: RAND, 2005).  
204 U.S. Institute for Peace, Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Institute of Peace, 2004). 
205 Wyler and Kenneth, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance. 
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with the eventual strategic interests of the Washington-based national security staff and 
the President. 
An example of a simple evaluation scorecard for assessing issues related to 
building ROL capacity is provided in Table 1, with an estimate of how Afghanistan 
would have been scored had such an assessment taken place before the inception of the 
MCTF-A. This scorecard illustrates the type of analysis that must be conducted by honest 
brokers to assess the viability of ROL programs fully before the U.S. government or 
individual agencies partake in large-scale justice system training or reforms. 
Table 1.   Sample Rule of Law Assessment Scorecard 
 
 
Admittedly, this type of evaluative process will be open to manipulation by 
parties with political agendas or particular tactical problems that they are attempting to 























Low but dependent 
on location 
Good acceptance of societal ROL 
alternatives; little acceptance of 
centrally run system 
Very uneven 
No political will for ROL, partly due 
to US actions undermining any ROL 
advances 
Little success of post-invasion 








MCTF-A, due to the intense political pressure felt by top American officials in Kabul to 
counter the growing insurgency. However, had such an objective assessment been 
conducted by people removed from the daily pressure of fighting the Taliban and AQ in 
Afghanistan, a more realistic design and approach to improving the ROL conditions and 
government legitimacy problems increasing Afghan support for the insurgency would 
likely have resulted, along with a more evenhanded application of assistance to all three 
justice pillars. Once the initial assessment has been completed, a plan to develop an 
appropriate program of training, mentoring, and equipping must be designed. 
f. What To Do with a Partner with Significant Deficiencies 
Some—perhaps many—of the countries in which the United States desires to 
build ROL in an effort to strengthen CT capacity will have deficiencies in the previously 
described strategic assessment. The result of the assessment, even if unfavorable, must be 
communicated to all U.S. partners, including those in the HN. Factors, such as regime 
changes, a personality-based culture, use of alternate justice solutions, and political will, 
can greatly affect a country’s interest in or ability to implement the reforms that the 
United States envisions. Deficiencies in any of the categories on the scorecard will have 
adverse effects on the potential success of any ROL program. However, procedural and 
policy adjustments, such as accommodating the use of alternate justice systems for civil 
dispute resolution or diverting additional resources to one of the three pillars with the 
greatest needs, can help to compensate for societal, cultural, and some governmental 
deficiencies. These adjustments must be embraced early in the program design process.  
Deficiencies in government legitimacy or in the political will of HN leaders must 
be solved politically, diplomatically, or perhaps, militarily. Appropriate U.S. government 
leaders must ensure that adequate incentives or risks of severe penalties are 
communicated to the leaders of potential CT partners. Additionally, ongoing evaluation 
must occur. All agencies must agree regarding the need to create a more legitimate 
government or stimulate political will, and both must fit with the U.S.’s strategic goals. A 
serious lack of political will or legitimacy should lead to the suspension of any potential 
ROL programs until the HN can be reassessed as having made adequate progress in both 
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categories. It is better to walk away from proposed efforts at an early stage than to 
expend significant resources in attempting to create a ROL program destined to fail that 
could poison political and diplomatic relations for years to come. 
Conducting a comprehensive and accurate assessment of potential countries that 
the FBI or the larger U.S. government may seek to assist with ROL capacity building is 
required to give all parties involved the best chance of building a program that can 
navigate each HN’s unique political, social, and legal framework. Once collected and 
analyzed, the information from the assessment should be used to inform those responsible 
for deciding if a ROL capacity-building program is feasible and what such a successful 
program should entail. 
2. Step 2: Designing an ROL Capacity-Building Program 
A cookie-cutter approach to building ROL capacity in partner HNs will not work. 
Each program must be specifically designed and implemented to account for that 
country’s legal, societal, cultural, and governmental peculiarities. Wholesale importing of 
Western-based justice solutions is unlikely to function as designed. Each ROL capacity-
building program should be built around the principles of comprehensiveness, an ends-
based approach, and sustainability.206  
a. A Comprehensive Plan to Improve ROL Capacity 
Capacity building and “empowering partner nations” are common concepts 
among U.S. government agencies in the new focus on non-military CT strategies. 
However, efforts to train, mentor, and equip law enforcement and internal security forces 
in HNs have been generally piecemeal and not part of a well-defined U.S. government 
strategy to improve ROL. Additionally, an emphasis needs to be placed on creating a 
solution that will last, even if the scale or scope of the solution must be decreased to 
increase the likelihood of the program surviving after international personnel and 
resources are removed. The following topics are requirements of a comprehensive and 
strategic plan for ROL reform and development. 
206 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
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(1) Sustainability. 
Creating or improving ROL capacity is useful only if the solutions created and 
programs established are sustainable with little input from international supporters.207 
While the region of which this HN is a part may be of great strategic interest today to the 
U.S. government, and the terrorist group operating in or around this country may be an 
acute threat to U.S. national security, eventually that focus will change. If a sustainable 
program for improving ROL has not been implemented or if the justice solutions cannot 
operate effectively without substantial investment by international partners, ROL 
improvements will not last. Two main considerations are discussed next that should guide 
the design of an ROL capacity-building program likely to be sustained by the HN. 
(2) Build On What Is Working.  
The nations that require capacity building are by definition lacking the resources, 
expertise, and/or cultural or governmental willingness to create a workable justice system 
on their own. Therefore, creating a justice system model that heavily taxes the country’s 
resources, cannot be effectively operated by the average practitioner, or will not gain 
social acceptance, is fruitless and wasteful.  
The U.S.’s efforts in Afghanistan and the FBI’s experience with the MCTF-A 
exemplify the creation of an unsustainable ROL system that violated all three of these 
principles. First, in 2010, the United States alone spent more than $400 million in 
supporting civilian-led ROL programs in Afghanistan, and DOD expenditures on ROL 
programs, although not effectively tracked, likely reached well into the billions of dollars 
per year.208 In contrast, the entire Afghan government’s 2014 budget was approximately 
$2.5 billion.209 The U.S. government, even without accounting for the sizable influx of 
other international aid for ROL programs, created a system completely out of balance 
with the Afghan government’s ability to sustain it financially. 
207 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
208 Wyler and Katzman, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance. 
209 Time Craig, “Afghan Official Says Government Has Nearly Run Out of Money, Needs U.S. 
Bailout,” Washington Post, September 16, 2014. 
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With regard to cultural acceptance, the overwhelming majority of all civil and 
criminal disputes in Afghanistan are settled within the traditional justice process and 
outside the formal state-run justice system.210 This Afghan traditional justice model is 
based on shuras and jirgas, and it places a greater emphasis on individual and community 
reconciliation as opposed to punitive measures. Although Afghans favor these alternative 
justice systems for a variety of cultural and legal reasons, a need still exists for a state-run 
system. The traditional justice system is often deeply entrenched along ethnic lines, and 
thus, fails to protect the rights of vulnerable populations or minority ethnic groups 
effectively.211  
Although the traditional Afghan justice system would have been unsuitable as a 
CT partner in the manner the MCTF-A was looked to fight the corrupt practices fueling 
the Taliban,212 creating a solution that completely ignores the traditional system’s 
popularity and cultural significance for resolving minor criminal offenses and civil 
disputes is not a sustainable solution. Using the state system to augment the traditional 
system in serious criminal cases and to ensure the rights of minorities and 
underrepresented ethnicities would be a more sustainable model than attempting to 
supplant the traditional system.213 Instituting and enforcing the use of the state-run 
justice system effectively diminished the credibility and pervasiveness of the traditional 
justice model. This error enabled the Taliban to exploit the opportunity and create its own 
system to fill the void, thereby increasing its popularity and acceptance by local Afghans. 
Again, this type of action, although well intentioned by U.S. and international sponsors, 
only creates a culturally unsustainable system that can actually undermine achievement 
of strategic goals in the area. 
210 Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan.” 
211 Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan.” 
212 Boone, “NATO Task Force to Form Afghan FBI.” 
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b. Start Small and Build on Successes 
While the tactics to fight an insurgency head-on and efforts to strengthen ROL are 
two very different activities, the ultimate objective of both is the same, persuading a 
population to accept the authority and legitimacy of its government to secure the 
country.214 As such, many of the principles of counterinsurgency apply to ROL capacity 
building. One especially important component of sustainability in this regard is “small is 
beautiful.”215 
General Petraeus asked the FBI to create the MCTF-A based on his experience in 
Iraq with the MCTF-I, another FBI-led capacity-building program designed to help build 
a professional cadre of investigators within the Iraqi MOI. The MCTF-I was created in 
2005 in a joint effort between the FBI and the DoS. The FBI stayed involved with the 
MCTF-I until 2011.  
The MCTF-I was a relatively small effort, and the total number of Iraqi 
investigators assigned to the task force remained between 30 and 35.216 The ratio of 
investigators to mentors was approximately two Iraqis for every U.S. mentor from the 
FBI or another federal law enforcement partner. Both the task force size and ratio of 
trainers to learners are in stark contrast to the Afghan version. The MCTF-A peaked at 
roughly 250 MOI investigators in 2010 with a dedicated international training cadre of 
roughly 30, which resulted in an investigator-to-mentor ratio of more than 8 to 1.217 
Moreover, the Iraqi investigators brought with them previous experience in investigating 
cases for trial in the state justice system, a background lacking in nearly all the MCTF-A 
investigators. 
214 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24. 
215 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24. 
216 Department of Justice, Factsheet: Department of Justice Efforts in Iraq (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice, 2008). 
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The MCTF-I made significant progress in attacking the type of violent and 
organized crimes fueling the Iraqi insurgency in the mid-2000s.218 The DoS, DOD, DOJ, 
and the Iraqi MOI all publicly recognized its work. General Petraeus’s experience with 
the MCTF-I, and his desire to recreate the success in Kabul, led to the creation of the 
MCTF-A, but in a much larger and more broadly defined manner. The large and broad 
endeavor, although fully in synch with the other DOD and DoS efforts, was in contrast to 
and out of line with the established and successful template used to build the MCTF-I.219 
Whether a smaller version of the MCTF-A would have succeeded is unknown; as 
long as the MCTF-A targeted high-level governmental corruption, it would have faced 
stiff opposition. However, applying the “small is beautiful” principle to other ROL efforts 
in Kabul and then disseminating what worked in that city to win the hearts and minds of 
the population in each valley, instead of trying to impose an ROL doctrine from a central 
behemoth on outlying areas, would undoubtedly have been a strategy more in line with 
counterinsurgency’s goal of making government more acceptable to its citizens. This 
“small is beautiful” approach is especially relevant to building ROL programs in 
countries geographically vast or in ethnically diverse areas with semi-autonomous 
population clusters.  
c. Three-Part Solution 
As noted throughout this thesis, the need for a justice system in which the 
policing, prosecutorial, and judicial sectors are all relatively equally capable cannot be 
overstated. Adaptability must also be written into any plan to address each of the three 
functions of ROL. In Afghan shuras (i.e., local consultations to resolve disputes) the 
attending elder often acts as investigator, prosecutor, and judge. Creating a program that 
provides uniformity of training to people serving in these three capacities would be one 
way to ensure that ROL is delivered in as independent manner as possible while not 
significantly changing the culturally accepted model. Similarly, adaptive measures were 
218 Dina Temple-Raston, “Elite Iraqi Task Force Probes Sensitive Crimes,” National Public Radio, 
March 28, 2008. 
219 Ibid. 
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introduced to account for the differences in Iraq’s legal system, which is based on the 
French Napoleonic Civil Code. In the Iraqi system, investigative judges (IJs) act as both 
lead investigators and prosecutors. To insure that these IJs were well versed in both of 
their duties, FBI agents and DOJ attorneys shared the mentoring role. 
Along with capability, institutional procedures must be in place to protect the 
independence of each sector against influence from the other two, political interference, 
or intimidation. As in Afghanistan, intimidation of the few prosecutors and judges willing 
to address corruption or terrorism issues is a common theme in many countries. 
Therefore, efforts, such as the USMS’ judicial security program in Kabul are essential 
within the comprehensive planning process. 
d. Legislative, Legal, and Governmental Support for Reforms 
It may be necessary or advisable to create entirely new agencies or departments 
within an HN’s justice system. If creating these new entities is a part of the plan for ROL 
development, the laws or legislation needed to ensure that these new entities are created 
according to the HN’s own legal guidelines must be in place first. A new policing or 
justice-sector agency may, as in the case of the MCTF-A, face opposition or reluctance to 
fully codify its right to exist and operate freely if political leaders view the new agency as 
a potential threat to their survival.220 
Also, if new or previously unused investigative techniques are to be introduced to 
improve investigative capabilities, the legal basis using the information developed 
through these new techniques must be established.221 For example, Afghan judges were 
unable (and unwilling) to allow evidence collected via technical intercepts to be used in 
corruption cases because the law that allowed the creation of the wiretap system 
authorized its use only in narcotics-related investigations. Similarly, in Iraq, U.S. efforts 
to use biometric evidence collected through the exploitation of recovered IEDs was 
220 Bueno De Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook. 
221 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
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rendered useless by many Iraqi judges’ unwillingness to accept this new type of scientific 
evidence.222  
While it is not possible to claim that if the correct legal authorities were created to 
legally support the MCTF-A and its investigations the MCTF-A would have succeeded, 
the lack of these authorities severely hindered the U.S. defense of the MCTF-A’s efforts 
and made hemming in its anti-corruption efforts easier for Afghan politicians.223 It is 
apparent that the lack of legal authorities did create a fundamental weakness in the 
MCTF-A that its sister unit in Kabul, the SIU,224 nor the previous MCTF in Baghdad 
experienced,225 and this weakness became increasingly apparent as pressure by Afghan 
leaders mounted.226 
Once an assessment of the potential HN is complete and the data collected was 
analyzed and used to devise and design a program that keeps in mind the key principles 
stated previously, sustainability, a three-part solution, and considers the required legal 
authorities, creating an effective implementation plan is possible. As with all the FBI’s 
efforts abroad, the FBI will need an effective team of U.S. government partners to 
achieve success.  
3. Step 3: Implementation and Building a Winning Coalition 
While the FBI’s experiences in running the MCTF-A and other smaller scale 
capacity-building efforts around the world is valuable to build HN law enforcement 
capabilities, the FBI should not lead any comprehensive ROL capacity-building plan. The 
FBI is not adequately funded or staffed to administer capacity building on the scale or of 
the scope required to improve an entire HN’s ROL system, and as evidenced by the 
political nature of the issue, these large endeavors must be led from the highest levels of 
the U.S. government and be coordinated with all logical governmental partners. 
222 Brian O’Neill, “Baby Steps in Policing Iraq,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 1, 2008. 
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However, the FBI should take the lead in conducting strategic assessments of countries 
that have terrorist enterprises operating within their borders. This role should be assigned 
to the FBI for two main reasons. First, the FBI has great awareness of the terrorist groups 
currently posing a threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad, as well as groups that 
could pose such a threat in the near future. Second, the FBI, as the MCTF-A and many 
recent programs have demonstrated, is frequently called upon to train and mentor foreign 
law enforcement agencies. To help countries from which terrorist threats currently or 
may soon emanate, the FBI should execute the assessment of whether the legal, cultural, 
and political factors in that country present a reasonable chance of success. 
The FBI can begin this assessment process by engaging with other U.S. 
departments and agencies tasked with capacity building or establishing CT resilience. 
These key partners are noted in the following sections, along with a discussion of the 
potential role of each partner. 
a. Necessary External Partners 
(1) Department of Defense.  
The DOD has a long history of assisting HNs with foreign internal defense (FID). 
FID has traditionally been oriented toward assisting military and paramilitary forces in 
tactical and operational activities directed against forces threatening the stability of the 
HN. However, in the post-9/11 world, the role of the military, specifically Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), has gradually expanded and the DOD, partly through choice 
and partly through necessity, is taking a larger role in police and legal system training.227 
Due to mission requirements and the desire to advance its CT and 
counterinsurgency policies, the DOD attempted to create large-scale policing and legal 
training programs in Iraq and Afghanistan.228 Although the long-term evaluation of the 
success of these programs is still incomplete, their short-term success was limited. While 
the success of the DOD’s recent efforts in law enforcement and ROL capacity building 
227 McChrystal, “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment.” 
228 The White House, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group Report on U.S. Policy Towards 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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are debatable,229 the DOD has a keen interest in building law enforcement and legal 
capacity in countries around the world, and it has a sizable funding stream for this type of 
foreign assistance.230 Additionally, as evidenced by the amount of money billions of 
dollars expended by the DOD in Afghanistan for reconstruction, and the myriad of ROL 
capacity-building efforts, bringing the DOD into any endeavor is necessary for a 
coordinated effort and not creating multiple programs with competing agendas.231 
The FBI must be willing to partner actively with the DOD because the primary 
objectives of both entities, whether during or immediately after conflict, are very similar, 
to shrink the size of the ungoverned or under-governed spaces that terrorist groups need 
as their bases for operations, and to build the legitimacy of governments and their ability 
to secure their own country effectively.  
(2) Department of State.  
The DoS, the U.S. government’s voice in foreign and diplomatic affairs, is the 
traditional U.S. supplier, sponsor, and funder of ROL capacity-building programs 
throughout the world.232 The DoS has a long history of unilaterally providing training via 
its INL Bureau and of providing grant assistance through the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), which has conducted programs, such as Anti-
Terrorism Assistance (ATA), as well as funding training and aid provided by other U.S. 
DOJ and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies.233 
Like the DOD, the DoS was very active in both Iraq and Afghanistan in 
attempting to build investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial capacity.234 In both 
countries, many of the DoS-sponsored efforts focused on large-scale investigative 
229 Boone, “NATO Task Force to Form Afghan FBI.”  
230 Rebecca Williams, Stephen Abott, and Gordon Adams, DOD Security Assistance Authorities 
(Stimson: Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense, 2009).  
231 Broadwell and Loeb, All In. 
232 “Programs and Initiatives,” accessed September 24, 2014. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/.  
233 Ibid. 
234 Wyler and Katzman, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance. 
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programs, some of which duplicated similar DOD-sponsored programs.235 The FBI also 
worked with the DoS on MCTFs in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the DoS fully 
funded the MCTF-I, and in Afghanistan, the DoS was responsible for assisting the FBI in 
creating the MCTF-A base of operations at Camp Falcon. 
The DoS will likely be a willing partner with the FBI because, unlike the DOD, 
the DoS does not have a large supply of personnel available for large-scale training 
endeavors. Therefore, the DoS often relies on contractors, who may be inadequately 
qualified, and can cost $200,000 to $300,000 per year or more.236 DoS reliance on 
contractors and the quality of training and mentorship provided by these contractors have 
drawn fire from Congress and government watchdogs.237 Therefore, the DoS would 
likely be very willing to partner with U.S. law enforcement agencies that can provide 
highly trained personnel, and possibly, at a much lower cost than contractors.  
As with the DOD, the DoS often sponsored numerous uncoordinated ROL 
programs. Additionally, the DoS was responsible for allocating billions of dollars in 
humanitarian, economic, and social aid to Afghan recipients. This aid was often diverted 
from the intended aid projects and was the source of much of the corruption that the 
MCTF-A was fighting. Without creating a strong partnership with the DoS to control the 
flow of funding into a HN’s government and economy, any ROL programs will be at a 
severe disadvantage when trying to augment ROL reforms; if the DoS was willing to use 
the billions of aid as a bargaining tool for helping build ROL reforms instead of 
continuing to fund reform or reconstruction efforts that the Karzai government was using 
to fund its cronies.238 
(3) Department of Justice.  
The DOJ maintains two internal training and capacity building programs, the 
office of overseas prosecutorial development, assistance, and training (OPDAT) and the 
235 Ibid. 
236 David Isenberg, “Are Private Contractors Really Cheaper?” Time, July 23, 2013. 
237 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, U.S. Agencies Have Provided 
Training and Support. 
238 Brinkley, “The Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of U.S. Aid to Afghanistan.” 
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international criminal investigative training and assistance program (ICITAP). OPDAT 
maintains regional legal advisors (RLAs) in 37 countries around the world and 
concentrates on helping countries develop judicial and prosecutorial capacity.239 ICITAP 
provides and funds police and investigative training for partner countries, but the 
program’s scale is small, and like INL, it often relies on other agencies or contractors to 
provide training.240 In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOJ attempted to carve out a more 
prominent role within U.S. government ROL capacity-building programs.241 The DOJ 
was integral in helping to train Iraqi IJs assigned to the MCTF-I, and these IJs were a 
primary reason for the success the MCTF-I enjoyed. The DOJ has also sought to use the 
FBI and its other law enforcement agencies to build clout and gain a more active role 
within U.S. government ROL efforts around the world.  
Both ICITAP and OPDAT have a history of working with international partners 
in building criminal and prosecutorial expertise.242 However, their small size, limited 
budget, and frequent reliance on others to conduct their training severely limit their 
ability to play a major role in large programs.243 OPDAT could play an important role in 
comprehensive CT capacity building in countries with similar legal systems.  
(4) Central Intelligence Agency.  
While the CIA does not have an explicit law enforcement or ROL mandate, it is 
the primary arm for U.S. CT efforts overseas.244 The CIA has a station in nearly every 
U.S. diplomatic establishment, whether embassy or consulate, and it often has 
considerable influence on U.S. policies within foreign countries and with HNs’ LE and 
intelligence agencies. The CIA has worked diligently to maintain its independence and 
239 “Assistance, and Training Description,” accessed 22 September 2014, http://www.justice.gov/ 
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influence in U.S. CT strategy and programs since 9/11. During the surges in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the CIA was at risk of being outspent and overrun by DOD’s activities in 
developing relations and building capacity within these countries’ LE and intelligence 
agencies.245 However, the CIA remains the preeminent CT partner for nearly every HN 
intelligence service and for many law enforcement services as well. 
Based on its sizable budget and its willingness to work with HN powerbrokers 
from whom law enforcement officials or diplomats would shy away, the CIA will 
continue to hold tremendous sway with both U.S. and HN officials in all countries in 
which the United States has a CT concern. As was demonstrated in Afghanistan, the CIA 
will be unwilling to support ROL efforts that may diminish its influence with senior HN 
officials or the political sway of prominent HN officials on its payroll. Of all the U.S. 
partners in capacity-building efforts, the CIA is the most important for coordination. 
Unless the proposed ROL program is fully endorsed by the CIA and the potential effects 
of the improved ROL may have on the CIA’s agenda, it is highly likely for conflict to 
occur, or for the ROL programs to run counter to CIA efforts, as was witnessed in Kabul.  
b. Necessary FBI Internal Partners 
(1) International Operations Division.  
The IOD owns all FBI personnel assigned overseas in the FBI’s legal attaché 
(Legat) offices. These Legats are the senior FBI agents in each HN and the lead law 
enforcement officials within U.S. embassies. They are best positioned to determine what 
type of LE training will be most beneficial and have the best relationships with HN law 
enforcement agency heads. While other FBI divisions may supply short-term personnel to 
build ROL programs, the Legat offices will be the enduring face of the FBI in the HN. 
Therefore, IOP personnel must first coordinate and approve any ROL programs before 
entering the design phase. A sustainable program must be able to be maintained by the 
few Legat personnel in each HN. 
 
245 Wyler and Katzman, Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance. 
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(2) Counterterrorism Division.  
CTD is responsible for all FBI terrorist investigations and all FBI CT policies and 
operations around the world. The CTD provides the FBI’s subject matter expertise on the 
management of domestic and worldwide CT investigations and operations. It is one of the 
FBI’s best-funded divisions but does not have sufficient personnel or agent-level 
investigative expertise to provide trainers for large-scale capacity-building programs. 
Although the MCTF-A was ostensibly a tool designed to assist in the fight against the 
growing insurgency in Afghanistan, the CTD had little involvement and interest in the 
task force mainly due to the FBI focusing on CT issues and not counterinsurgency 
problems, even though a link may exist between the two efforts. Within the FBI, any 
capacity-building program must have the full support of the substantive division or the 
FBI resources, and personnel needed to support the endeavor may be limited. 
(3) Criminal Investigative Division.  
The CID carries responsibility for all FBI criminal programs and is the FBI 
division with the longest history of running long-term enterprise investigations. The CID 
may have the capacity to undertake short-term training programs, but like CTD, would 
rely on field office personnel to staff long-term training endeavors.  
Although the CID does not seem like a natural partner for CT-focused capacity-
building programs, the FBI’s experience in training MCTF-A investigators clearly 
demonstrated that many of the necessary investigative skills are best taught by criminal 
investigators. Additionally, teaching new investigators to focus on basic criminal 
investigative methods allows them to build cases and not become reliant upon U.S. or 
internationally supplied advanced technology that they likely will not be able to keep 
operating in the long term. 
(4) Critical Incident Response Group.  
Known as the “FBI’s toolbox,” the CIRG is responsible for responding to, 
managing, and resolving critical incidents within the United States and around the world. 
The CIRG owns many of the programs from which HN law enforcement and intelligence 
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agencies frequently request training, such as tactical training, negotiations, crisis 
management, and behavioral sciences.  
One of the most successful aspects of the FBI’s involvement in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan was the development of biometric collection and analysis centers. 
AltThough the CIRG does not control the technology used to collect and match 
fingerprints of known and suspected terrorists or to match known prints to those 
recovered during the exploitation of evidence, such as IEDs, CIRG personnel were 
integrally involved in the large enrollment campaigns and have much of the historical and 
operational knowledge of how to manage these efforts effectively. 
(5) FBI Academy.  
The FBI academy, through new agent training and national academy classes, 
trains hundreds of U.S. and international students in modern LE techniques. While the 
FBI academy does not possess the subject matter expertise or local knowledge to provide 
in-country training to HN LE agencies, it does have significant experience and expertise 
in building training programs and in administering large, long-term training programs. 
(6) Subject Matter Experts.  
The FBI has developed a large cadre of SMEs on a plethora of basic and 
advanced investigative and forensic techniques. Much of the FBI’s expertise in biometric 
collection, forensic examination, and explosive identification, would greatly improve 
many of the potential partner countries’ LE and CT capabilities. 
Building a cadre of experienced trainers and SMEs prepared to deploy was a 
challenge in building the MCTF-A. Accomplishing this task and being able to tap into 
this resource for assessments will be necessary to assess HN levels of expertise 
adequately and accurately in basic and highly specialized LE techniques. 
B. SUMMARY 
Effectively conducting even a small-scale program to improve LE or ROL 
capacity requires a myriad of partners to ensure the endeavor is appropriately designed, 
effectively operated, sustainable, and is in line with the U.S.’s overarching strategy 
 74 
within the country and region. Building a coalition of all these external and internal 
partners will not be easy, but it is not necessary to have all these partners on board during 
each phase of the process. If the FBI seeks to conduct assessments of HNs that could 
benefit from ROL capacity building, it should include all relevant internal and external 
stakeholders. Leaving out stakeholders will only create miscommunications that lead to 
interagency friction or will leave out necessary expertise in creating a workable solution. 
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IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR FBI CAPACITY BUILDING 
The experience of the MCTF-A, the struggles of the entire ROL capacity-building 
program enterprise in Afghanistan, the mixed record of success that the United States and 
its international partners have achieved in ROL capacity building around the world, and 
the level of effort and coordination required to design and implement a successful 
capacity-building program, all raise the question, why should the FBI ever consider 
building law enforcement or justice-system capacity and capability at all? It would be 
easy to conclude from the FBI’s experience in the MCTF-A that the FBI should stay 
away from capacity-building programs completely and that the potential downsides and 
political fallout from these programs, especially if not well aligned with U.S. government 
strategy, can outweigh the potential upsides of creating a more robust justice system in a 
developing country. However, that argument would be shortsighted and would ignore the 
long-term, and possibly, widespread benefits of strengthening HNs’ ROL infrastructure, 
as well as the benefits for U.S. national security interests. 
The author presents three arguments why the U.S. government, and specifically 
the FBI, should continue to pursue opportunities actively to conduct ROL and justice-
system capacity-building programs with current and future U.S. international CT 
partners. 
A. THE MILITARY IS NOT THE ANSWER TO EVERY QUESTION 
The military instrument of power is actually more effective dealing with 
strength-on-strength situations than it is dealing with strength-on-
weakness scenarios.  
—General Martin Dempsey, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Well-administered civilian policing before, during, and after efforts by terrorist 
groups to gain legitimacy with a local population, is the most effective way to counter the 
rise or spread of terrorist groups.246 In the first decade since 9/11, the United States relied 
heavily on direct military action in the form of large-scale invasions, SOF raids, or 
246 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
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kinetic attacks as the primary weapon in CT efforts abroad. This military-centric 
approach has brought the United States several major and high profile tactical victories. 
However, none of the terrorist groups targeted by the United States through either large-
scale military action or pinpointed special operations have stopped targeting U.S. 
interests in the homeland or abroad; on the contrary, some have actually grown stronger 
and more capable. The growth and resilience of the Taliban and the other groups 
comprising the Afghan insurgency in the face of the United States and its international 
partners’ most concerted military efforts demonstrate the limits of military power on 
affecting or influencing public support for terrorist groups or their ability to operate. 
A need will always exist for a directed, short-term military action to respond to 
imminent threats to U.S. national security, rescue U.S. hostages, or counter tactical gains 
made by insurgent groups, such as those currently achieved by the Islamic State in Iraq. 
However, direct military action has not proved to be an effective tool for eliminating 
terrorist groups or as a long-term strategy for stopping their spread.247 Additionally, even 
though U.S. Army leadership now stresses post-conflict stability operations as a core 
mission of U.S. soldiers,248 the typical U.S. soldier is not adequately prepared to carry 
out policing operations in a foreign country, nor would these soldiers ever gain public 
acceptance to the same extent as local or even international law enforcement officers.249 
Historically, the use of military forces exclusively to combat terror and insurgent 
groups operating within a civilian population has proven very difficult and problematic, 
because the skill set needed to fight these groups or conduct policing operations is 
inherently different from the skills used in traditional warfare.250 Since the second wave 
of modern terrorism, involving the growth of nationalist terror groups, started in the early 
247 Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terror Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida 
(Washington, DC: RAND, 2008). 
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20th century,251 one of the key tactics of terror groups has been to target and overwhelm 
the police’s capacity to respond to or protect the population from terrorist attacks.252 
These early terror groups believed that if they could take out the local police, the eyes 
and ears of the government would be effectively removed. Additionally, they hoped to 
prompt a military overreaction by the domestic government or an outside nation by 
creating a crisis situation due to the breakdown of civil policing, as well as of basic law 
and order. Strategy plans recovered from early nationalist terror groups. such as the Irish 
Republican Army and modern AQ manuals. both note the aim of first attacking the police 
in an area in which they were trying to gain acceptance, in the hope of spurring a clumsy 
or overzealous military response that would further alienate a disaffected population.253 
This strategy of attacking the civilian police to create a military reaction was 
evident in the early days of the Afghanistan rebuilding effort and one of the most 
worrisome main tactics to U.S. commanders. The Taliban and the insurgency had a clear 
plan to direct many of their attacks against the nascent Afghan police force. See Table 2. 
Table 2.   Afghan Military and Police Personnel Killed by Insurgent Attacks 
Period Military killed or wounded 
Police killed or 
wounded 
21 March 2002–20 March 2003 9 39 
20 March 2003–20 March 2004 92 75 
21 March 2004–21 March 2005 138 183 
21 March 2005–20 October 2005 226 266254 
 
As stated within the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual, one goal of 
counterinsurgency operations is to build a legitimate government capable of policing its 
citizens through cooperation rather than coercion.255 Thus, it should also be the FBI’s 




254 Tonita Murray, “Police Building in Afghanistan, A Case Study on Civil Security Reform,” 
International Peacekeeping 14, 1 (February 2007).  
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goal in its assistance to partner countries. Enabling a country to build a respected, 
legitimate, competent, and capable LE and internal intelligence service will reduce the 
likelihood that a terror group will be able to tear down the government’s legitimacy to the 
extent that military action by the U.S. or international partners will be necessary. Also, in 
post-conflict nations, only creating a nation capable of policing its own borders, 
providing security to its citizens, and possessing a functional ROL process, will allow the 
U.S. military to withdraw with the knowledge that it has established the best possible 
conditions for legitimacy. 
The MCTF-A was designed to be part of the stated civilian-military partnership 
for countering the Afghan insurgency and for bringing a whole-of-government approach 
to solving the issue of Afghan governmental legitimacy. One of the key take aways from 
this effort should not be that the effort was wasted or should not be attempted again, but 
that the partnership between the civilian and military efforts must be earlier and more 
robust if it is going to have a better chance of success. 
B. BUILDING A CAPABLE JUSTICE SYSTEM IS A KEY PART OF THE 
LONG-TERM SOLUTION 
The resultant over-emphasis on short-term military dimensions of the 
global war on terrorism—as opposed to a more comprehensive strategy to 
addressing the long-term root causes of poor governance, instability and 
extremism in countries at risk—could have unintended consequences 
similar to those that arose during the Cold War, when the United States 
often purchased short-term acquiescence at the expense of long-term 
stability and sustained development.  
—Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, “The Pentagon and Global 
Development: Making Sense of the DOD’s Expanding Role” 
The long-term solution to this so-called fourth wave of modern terrorism is to 
create an atmosphere that does not allow Jihadist terrorist groups to exploit an 
incompetent or unjust law enforcement and justice system to gain acceptance with their 
targeted in-group, or to take advantage of a government’s inability of a nation to provide 
security to its citizens.256 Military intervention has proven to be a potent short-term 
256 Jones and Libicki, How Terror Groups End. 
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method to attack the physical attributes of terror groups, but in response, most terror 
groups have avoided setting themselves up as readily identifiable, easy targets for a 
conventional military strategy.257 Few terror groups try to mount military-style 
campaigns against nation-states, and even fewer have succeeded.258 In contrast, the 
Taliban and other terror and insurgent groups have been very successful in using real or 
perceived injustices within a society to gain a safe haven for training or operations, or in 
undermining the legitimacy of a nation’s government through small-scale criminal 
attacks.259 
The U.S. public and political leaders, as demonstrated in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, will not have the long-term patience required to keep sizable numbers of 
U.S. forces deployed in an active role in post-conflict nations. Also, even if the United 
States does seek to maintain troops in a post-conflict nation, it is not guaranteed, as seen 
most recently in Iraq, that the government of that nation will agree to accept them. 
However, providing ROL capacity building and police training feels much less like an 
invasion and does not undermine the legitimacy of the government that welcomes these 
forms of assistance. Therefore, countries are much more likely to accept these types of 
aid than to permit outside military forces to remain on their territory.260  
Building or rebuilding a government that can secure its own country, produce a 
workable ROL framework, and gain popular legitimacy is a slow and methodical process 
and one that must begin as soon as possible after a conflict or sweeping governmental 
reform. Maintaining the institutional patience to keep large numbers of U.S. forces 
deployed in a country well after the perceived completion of active combat is not a 
politically viable solution. However, capacity-building efforts, even large-scale ones, 
require very little resources when compared to the financial and personnel needed to 
maintain U.S. forces in support of operations to stabilize a foreign government. 
257 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
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Lastly, to degrade the capabilities and attractiveness of Jihadist terror groups 
permanently, the focus on operational successes must be replaced with a focus on 
significantly changing the cultural environment that allows these groups to attract recruits 
and win popular support. The cultivation of terrorists willing to give up their own life in 
support of an extremist cause is a psychological process that can be envisioned as a 
staircase.261 As individuals move up to each floor, their worldview and sense of what are 
acceptable actions become narrower and rigidly defined.262 The FBI, like all U.S. 
agencies tasked with CT duties, has focused exclusively on the upper floors of this 
staircase, by which point a person has already developed a worldview that motivates 
taking violent action to support the self-identified in-group. Just like reliance on direct 
military action to counter international CT threats, this reliance on operational success 
does not get to the root causes of the problem. Many of these root causes relate to HNs’ 
ongoing creation of political and judicial environments that drive these potential terrorists 
to higher floors of the staircase. 
The FBI must always be willing to cooperate with partner countries on 
operational matters, and to monitor and mitigate threats posed by those on the highest 
floors of the terrorism staircase. However, it must also work on ROL and police capacity-
building programs that may not have direct and immediate impact on CT cases in these 
same countries but that will stem or slow down the flow of persons moving up the 
staircase to increasing radicalization due to the absence of basic justice solutions or 
security protections. Without a significant and deliberate effort to build ROL capacity in 
countries in which terror groups seek a safe haven, the FBI will have to continue relying 
on operational-level successes to mitigate threats and safeguard the security of both the 
U.S. homeland and U.S. interests abroad. 
 
261 Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism.” 
262 Ibid. 
 82 
                                                 
C. COOPERATION IS IMPORTANT, BUT COMPETENCE IS THE TRUE 
FORCE MULTIPLIER 
The most effective weapon against crime is cooperation.  
—J. Edgar Hoover 
The U.S. national CT strategy and the FBI’s own strategy for combating 
international-based terror groups (and others inspired by these groups) that seek to 
execute attacks on the United States, call for increased international cooperation and 
building security partnerships with foreign police and intelligence services.263 The 
advantages of cooperation, intelligence, and information sharing, and joint operations are 
obvious in a world in which terrorist threats, such as the one the MCTF-A was designed 
to counter, are all transnational and often intermixed with organized and equally 
transnational criminal enterprises. Also, effective cooperation between the United States 
and other national police and intelligence services acts as a force multiplier for U.S. CT 
and security efforts in the region. However, to obtain the maximum benefit from this 
cooperation, the most competent partners possible must be utilized.  
Providing threat reports to an HN police force incapable of mounting any 
challenge to the ensconced terror group is not productive; providing intelligence to 
corrupt law enforcement or investigative services is even worse. Having capable, 
competent, and professional justice-sector partners is the best way to capture the synergy 
needed to combat terrorism effectively on the operational, tactical, and strategic levels. 
Cooperation is a great buzzword, but it rests on the premise that the party with which -
people cooperating can pull its own weight; otherwise, the cooperation is one-sided. 
Successfully fighting terrorism has always required a team effort, and the best way to 
maximize any team’s potential is to raise the skill level of each team member.  
The FBI, possibly more than any other U.S. agency with a CT mandate, depends 
on competent international partnerships in conducting its mission. Most terror groups 
operate outside the United States. The FBI has only about 300 employees permanently 
stationed overseas, and the FBI’s budget for combating international terrorism is a 
263 White House, National Counterterrorism Strategy. 
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fraction of that of the DOD, the DoS, or the CIA.264 However, three points work in the 
FBI’s favor. It has a highly trained and competent workforce able and willing to train and 
mentor U.S. international partners, a long history of building effective LE networks 
through training programs, such as the National Academy, and a reputation for 
investigative excellence that causes foreign LE and intelligence agencies and U.S. 
departments alike to seek out the FBI’s capacity-building expertise. The FBI should fully 
capitalize on other countries’ desire to increase their own competence through FBI 
training, and on the willingness of other U.S. government agencies to pay for this 
training.265  
While the FBI will likely not reap many direct rewards from its involvement with 
and efforts to build the MCTF-A, had the task force been designed differently or targeted 
insurgency in a more politically and culturally accepted manner with lasting positive 
effects, a productive relationship may have been possible that would have surely 
increased the FBI’s operational capacity within the region. A good example of the FBI 
raising the competence and capacity of HN law enforcement agencies throughout East 
Africa is notably Kenya’s Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, which had a positive effect on the 
FBI’s ability to execute its mandate to counter threats around the globe. Each partner the 
FBI helps become better at its job and makes the job of a terrorist harder.  
D. SUMMARY 
Stopping or even slowing down the spread of terrorist groups throughout the 
developing world is a daunting and challenging task. However, it is a task that the FBI 
must be prepared to accomplish because neither the FBI nor any U.S. government agency 
has the resources or ability to fight international terrorism unilaterally. U.S. and 
international efforts in Afghanistan demonstrate that even bringing all the resources of 
the U.S. government together to fight a common threat cannot be expected to rid a 
country of a terrorist group operating within its borders if that group has the popular 
support of the population. The FBI must seek to counter the appeal of these terrorist 
264 Fuentes, Assistant Director, Office of International Operations, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
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groups, degrade their safe havens, and create capable and legitimate LE partners, and not 
simply rely on singular operational successes to counter threats to U.S. interests at home 
and abroad. 
By conducting a thorough assessment of potential CT partner nations and their 
current political, legal, and justice sectors and ROL structure, designing a sustainable, 
culturally, and politically viable capacity-building plan; and building a winning coalition 
of FBI and other U.S. government entities, the FBI can better confront the terror threats 
currently menacing the United States and the world. Furthermore, it can build a more 
robust ROL framework that will have positive and broad societal impacts on these 
partner countries. Well-designed and implemented capacity-building programs will not 
only help the FBI counter imminent threats but will also help the United States address 
the underlying political, social, and cultural issues and deficiencies that allow terror 
groups to grow. Such programs are a crucial component of the long-term battle to defeat 
terrorism. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The MCTF-A was established in an effort to disrupt and dismantle the funding 
and support streams fueling the Taliban and other insurgent groups attempting to tear 
down the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its international supporters. While 
the Afghan insurgency is a unique problem in terms of size, scope, and complexities 
involved with so many international military and political players in the mix, the goal of 
the insurgency is the same as other terrorist groups operating in un- or -undergoverned 
spaces around the world, win the support of the local population and turn this population 
against the terrorist group’s adversaries. A key tenet of the Afghan insurgency, as with 
virtually all terrorist groups, is the concept of the exploiting the perceived injustices 
against the population either by the HN government, the occupation force, or simply 
“America” writ large. The MCTF-A was an attempt to counter that message and 
demonstrate to the Afghans, particularly those supporting the insurgency, either through 
corrupt political practices or by violent opposition to the coalition, that the rule of law 
would be applied uniformly regardless of political position, power, or ethnicity. In the 
end, national leaders decided that short-term tactical gains were more advantageous to 
U.S. security interests in the region than was the further establishment of a robust ROL 
system in Afghanistan.266  
While, as was thoroughly discussed in Chapter II, the ultimate decision to back 
away from the MCTF-A’s mission of attacking high-level corruption to stem the flow of 
resources and support to the insurgency was out of the FBI’s hands. The FBI and other 
MCTF-A supporters do bear some of the onus for backing the United States into the 
corner it found itself with the Karzai administration in 2010. The FBI’s shortcomings in 
the design and operation of the MCTF-A fall into three broad categories. 
 
266 Chayes, “The Afghan Bag Man.” 
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A. SOCIAL 
The MCTF-A, and much of the entire ROL capacity building effort of the U.S. 
government during the so-called “civilian uplift,” was not built to fit into the unique 
cultural and social constraints of the Afghan society. The solution envisioned by the 
MCTF-A to fight insurgency did not account for the deep seated personality-based 
Afghan culture and the long-standing and culturally accepted criminal patronage 
networks used to build political and military power for generations.267 
B. LEGAL 
The necessary legal framework to support the MCTF-A was not created prior to 
the MCTF-A starting to operate. By not having the laws in place to support the type of 
evidence MCTF-A investigators and their FBI mentors would seek to use to prosecute 
cases, and not even having a law in place legally to establish the legitimacy of the 
MCTF-A, the task force investigators and officials were left vulnerable to the corrupt 
judiciary and political officials seeking to reign in the MCTF-A’s corruption 
investigations. 
C. POLITICAL 
The creators of the MCTF-A faced a two-sided political opposition. The MCTF-A 
was designed and stood up without the participation or concurrence of the highest levels 
of the Karzai administration. This lack of coordination with senior Afghan officials led to 
the MCTF-A, again, being vulnerable to attacks from these political figures who could 
claim that the task force was an American creation designed to attack U.S. adversaries 
and not to advance ROL principles. Also, the MCTF-A faced unseen U.S. political 
opposition that eventually was the death-blow for the task force. By not ensuring a 
solidarity of political effort prior to creating the MCTF-A, the MCTF-A investigators and 
officials attempting to ferret out Afghan corruption were forced not only to overcome 
Afghan opposition but obstruction from other U.S. agencies and senior government 
267 Hooker, A Cross-Cultural View of Corruption. 
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officials who saw the LE goals of the task force running counter to their covert and 
intelligence-driven objectives. 
In the end, the MCTF-A failed due to the lack of political support from either the 
U.S. or Afghan governments for the ROL goals the MCTF-A and the other Afghan ROL 
capacity-building programs built in the late 2000s. The social and legal hurdles that 
should have been negotiated prior to the MCTF-A’s design could likely have been 
overcome if political leaders from both sides had agreed the objectives of the task force 
were in the best interest of both countries’ national security goals for Afghanistan and the 
region. However, because the political support of the goals of the MCTF-A was not 
solidified with both sides prior to the MCTF-A beginning the operation, the eventual 
stalemate between the United States and the Karzai administration was likely inevitable. 
It is unlikely the FBI will face a situation identical to the one the MCTF-A was 
created to help solve. However, the CT problem the MCTF-A, and similar ROL capacity 
programs, are asked to address is becoming more prevalent throughout the world. Jihadist 
and religious-based terror groups have multiplied in areas throughout the Middle East and 
Africa, due to the social, political and legal conditions required to allow these groups to 
take root being present in many post-conflict and developing countries.268 As in 
Afghanistan, the FBI is being asked to help design and implement ROL capacity-building 
programs that will increase the HN’s CT capabilities while strengthening the country’s 
ROL and justice system to build the government’s legitimacy with the population the 
terrorist group is attempting to attract. 
Before the FBI undertakes capacity-building programs similar to the MCTF-A or 
any large-scale endeavor designed to strengthen a HN’s ROL capacity or capability, the 
FBI should carefully examine the lessons detailed in Chapter II, but also adhere to the 
following principles thoroughly explained in Chapter III. 
268 Jones et al., Establishing Law and Order after Conflict. 
 89 
                                                 
D. CONDUCT A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 
to fully understand the environment in which a capacity-building program will be 
required to operate and succeed, the FBI must partner with other U.S. government 
agencies and conduct a thorough strategic assessment of the potential partner country. 
This assessment must include an examination of the HN’s distant and recent history, 
social/cultural framework, and the current status of the legitimacy of the government with 
which the program is designed to work. Additionally, a through study of the country’s 
justice system is required. This study must include views on justice-social relations (how 
does the population view the justice system), political involvement in the justice system, 
and past training of law enforcement or other ROL components, and the outcome of that 
training.269 
E. DESIGN AND END-BASED CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAM270  
Any large-scale effort to boost ROL capacity or capability must be rooted in a 
culturally acceptable and sustainable solution.271 As shown in Afghanistan, the emphasis 
on a central government justice solution devalued the more culturally accepted tribal 
justice system for resolving minor criminal offences and civil disputes. In turn, an 
opportunity was created for the Taliban to create a parallel system of justice more in line 
with Afghan social norms.272  
Along with being culturally sustainable, any ROL program must be politically 
sustainable. High-minded and rules-based ideals of how to create a western style justice 
system often look good in the design phase but often fall apart when hit with the political 
realities of two countries that may have differing views on the ultimate goals of the ROL 
program or on what is in their respective best national security interests.273  
269 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” 319–41. 
273 Ibid. 
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F. BUILD A COALITION 
As referenced in the previous point and detailed in Chapter III, building a 
coalition of U.S. supporters is necessary to ensure all relevant partners have a voice in 
designing and implementing the ROL program. As the MCTF-A demonstrated, good 
intentions and cooperation by only a portion of the U.S. inter-agency can lead to actions 
by other U.S. agencies that are not only not supportive but can be solidly 
counterproductive to both the ROL program, as well as the legitimacy of the HN 
government. 
G. THE WAY AHEAD 
Foreign partners are essential to the success of our CT efforts; these states 
are often themselves the target of—and on the front lines in countering—
terrorist threats. The United States will continue to rely on and leverage 
the capabilities of its foreign partners even as it looks to contribute to their 
capacity and bolster their will. 
—National Strategy for Counterterrorism, White House, June 2011 
Due to all the reasons documented in Chapter IV, the FBI simply walking away 
from capacity-building endeavors because the experience of the MCTF-A is not a 
desirable or realistic course of action. Building more capable international partners who 
can effectively secure their own borders and police their countries, while at the same time 
strengthening their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens by enhancing ROL and 
building effective justice systems, is not a goal that only benefits the HN but it improves 
the security of the United States by shrinking the areas in which terrorist groups can 
operate. The principle of enabling U.S. CT partners to team more effectively with the 
United States to fight terrorism is a key tenet of the U.S.’s National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism, “[t]he United States alone cannot eliminate every terrorist or terrorist 
organization that threatens our safety, security, or interests. Therefore, we must join with 
key partners and allies to share the burdens of common security.”274 The FBI should not 
shy away from these capacity-building endeavors due to its experience with the MCTF-
A; however, it must be smarter and more deliberative in how and with whom ROL and 
274 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism. 
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law enforcement capacity building endeavors are built. Along with adhering to the 
principles laid out previously, and in Chapter III to build ends-based and sustainable ROL 
capacity-building programs, the FBI and its U.S. government partners should keep in 
mind two other important lessons learned.275 
1. Start Now 
The task laid out before the MCTF-A, and so thoroughly described in Chapter II, 
to counter the political corruption fueling the growing insurgency in 2009, was made 
even more challenging due to the fact the U.S. and international donors had been pouring 
billions of aid into the Afghan political and economic system on an annual basis for 
nearly eight years by the time the MCTF-A was formed.276 It is impossible to say 
definitively what the outcome would have been if the FBI and the U.S. government had 
earnestly strengthened ROL capacity building from the very beginning of the 
international occupation. However, it can be shown that the tens of billions of largely 
uncoordinated and untracked aid that had been flowing into Afghanistan in the eight 
years prior made the task harder by codifying and institutionalizing the corrupt practices 
of the Afghan government.  
The United States had and continues to have a national security interest in beating 
the insurgent and terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, partly due to a weak central 
government viewed by many in the country as illegitimate and not representative or 
equally protective of its citizens. The exact same statement can be made about numerous 
countries throughout Africa and the Middle East in which AQ affiliates or Jihadist terror 
groups have found safe haven. The FBI should be looking at these countries now and 
assessing if these countries are suitable partner nations for the U.S. government to help 
build its capabilities and strengthen its legitimacy through ROL capacity-building 
programs. If the FBI or other U.S. agencies can move in early to sponsor ROL programs 
275 Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? 
276 Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, The U.S. Civilian Uplift in 
Afghanistan has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its Management and 
Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other Agencies. 
 92 
                                                 
at the earliest stages of U.S. involvement, or support these partners countries, it is 
possible that a fate similar to that of the MCTF-A can be avoided. 
By starting as early as possible in engagement with CT partner countries, it is also 
helpful to craft a truly “whole of government” approach. Although this approach was 
called for in Afghanistan, again, it was not until 2009 that this idea was actively pressed. 
By then, each major U.S. department had already built its lines of engagement and 
strategy, and it was much more difficult to convince these agencies to abandon their 
unilateral approach in favor of a more inclusive and coordinated policy. 
2. Keep it Low Key and Out of the Press 
As previously stated and thoroughly documented in Chapter II, it was likely 
inevitable that the MCTF-A would lead the U.S. and the international community to an 
impasse with the Karzai administration over the investigation of high-level corruption 
within the Afghan government. Reasons for this conflict were thoroughly detailed 
previously, and possible remedies to avoid similar confrontations over ROL programs 
were also documented. However, a key point that should not be overlooked is that the 
impasse did not need to be as public as it was, and it can be seen that as the publicity over 
the conflict grew, Karzai became even more intransigent in his unwillingness to 
cooperate with the United States, and in his view, look to give in to international 
demands.277 
From the very beginning, great fanfare occurred over the creation of the MCTF-
A.278 As the number of cases mounted and arrests were made, the DOD, the DoS and the 
FBI all tried to capture good press and publicize the success of the “Afghan FBI.” Again, 
speeches and statements by high-ranking U.S. officials about how the MCTF 
investigators and their FBI mentors were aggressively pursuing corruption cases were 
thrown in the face of Karzai, and he was asked to comment. Invariably, Karzai’s public 
denials and counteraccusations would only serve to start a new round of stories when 
they were taken back to U.S. senior leaders in Kabul and Washington. 
277 Nordland and Filkins, “Antigraft Units, Backed by U.S.” 
278 “Major Crimes Task Force: A Key Element of the Road Map.”  
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As with many of the recommendations offered in this document, simply not 
enough data is available to say which strategies and tactics will undoubtedly work, but 
the case study of the MCTF-A does help indicate which ones did not work effectively. 
Making the FBI’s efforts to build capacity and strengthen ROL public is one such 
strategy that should not be repeated. While the MCTF-A and the FBI did gain some 
goodwill and support from powerful U.S. supporters by publicizing their efforts to build 
the “Afghan FBI,” it must be understood that political support can be short-lived and 
fickle. The same senior White House leaders who publicly spoke on behalf of the MCTF-
A and its efforts were quick to abandon the task force when it was determined its goals 
no longer were inline with the overarching national security goals for Afghanistan. While 
some publicity in the HN is necessary to ensure the public is aware of the positive steps 
being taken by their government to improve ROL for all citizens, this publicity should be 
strongly coordinated with the HN government and not presented in a manner that creates 
an oppositional relationship as was the case with the United States and President Karzai. 
H. SUMMARY 
In particular, law enforcement helps us in at least three ways—it disrupts 
terrorist plots through arrests, incapacitates terrorists through incarceration 
after prosecution, and it can be used to obtain intelligence from terrorists 
or their supporters through interrogation, and through recruiting them as 
cooperating assets.  
—David Kris, former assistant attorney general for national security,  
Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, June 15, 2011 
Building strong capable partners to help protect the U.S. homeland and U.S. 
interests abroad from terrorism, along with reducing and denying access to ungoverned 
spaces from which terrorist groups can operate, must be a top priority of the FBI. As the 
lead agency for protecting the homeland from terrorism, the FBI must continually seek 
out opportunities to push CT efforts beyond U.S. borders and into the areas terror groups 
are now operating or where the conditions are right for these groups to try to expand. The 
MCTF-A was the FBI’s first attempt to build a large-scale program to accomplish this 
mission, but it must not be the last attempt of the FBI to strengthen law enforcement and 
ROL capacity with countries post-conflict and developing countries. 
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Law enforcement as a tool against terrorism is not the panacea and will not be the 
right tool for all circumstances. However, working with HN LE and justice sector 
agencies to improve their capacity, capabilities, and ROL can have positive and long-
lasting societal and cultural effects that other tools, such as military or covert action, 
cannot. The FBI should fully examine the lessons learned from the MCTF-A and begin 
working with other U.S. agencies to examine what countries are most suitable for future 
law enforcement and justice sector capacity-building programs. The FBI should not only 
be relying on continued operational successes to counter terrorist threats but should also 
be building international partners capable of effectively executing the CT fight and also 
addressing many of the underlying societal and justice system issues present in these 
countries that are creating terrorist safe havens. 
The threat of international terrorism is not diminishing, and terrorist groups are 
continuing to search for or attempting to create space within post-conflict, weak, or 
developing nations to operate and launch attacks against the U.S. homeland or U.S. 
interests abroad. Also, the preeminence of the FBI in the international LE community and 
the number of countries that continue to seek out training from the United States to 
strengthen their justice and LE capabilities, or expand their capacities point to programs 
like the MCTF-A, is not ending anytime soon. American philosopher and behaviorist B. 
F. Skinner stated, “(a) failure is not always a mistake, it may simply be the best one can 
do under the circumstances. The real mistake is to stop trying.”279 The FBI must not stop 
trying to build better CT partners and improve ROL standards around the world, but 
unless the FBI learns from the lessons taught by the MCTF-A, it is highly likely future 
capacity-building endeavors will not be as successful or effective as possible, and 
possibly will be detrimental to the U.S.’s overarching national security strategies. 
279 Kendra Cherry, “Quotes by American Psychologist B. F Skinner,” accessed November 30, 2014, 
http://psychology.about.com/od/psychologyquotes/a/bf-skinner-quotes.htm. 
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